Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec and WebFinger

=JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com> Fri, 05 October 2012 18:27 UTC

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Cc: IETF WebSec WG <websec@ietf.org>, 'Gonzalo Salgueiro' <gsalguei@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec and WebFinger
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 > Specifically, it is the use of a 301 as specified in Section
 > 7.2.  If a UA requests initially visits a site like www.paypal.com, it would
 > not know if the host is an HSTS host or not.  Use of 301 is not secure and
 > the user agent could be maliciously redirected to someplace other than a
 > site owned by PayPal, for example.

Yes, this is well-understood and (prominently) noted in the security 
considerations...

###
14.6.  Bootstrap MITM Vulnerability

    The bootstrap MITM (Man-In-The-Middle) vulnerability is a
    vulnerability users and HSTS Hosts encounter in the situation where
    the user manually enters, or follows a link, to an unknown HSTS Host
    using a "http" URI rather than a "https" URI.  Because the UA uses an
    insecure channel in the initial attempt to interact with the
    specified server, such an initial interaction is vulnerable to
    various attacks (see Section 5.3 of [ForceHTTPS]).

    NOTE:  There are various features/facilities that UA implementations
           may employ in order to mitigate this vulnerability.  Please
           see Section 12 "User Agent Implementation Advice".
###


Plus, this spec is now a done deal.


However, the notion of devising some means for declaring general (web) host 
security policy and capabilities is one that's been discussed in various 
contexts (it's the question you're begging in your msg, IMV) -- and, yes, that's 
something to (now) put more cycles into thinking about.

=JeffH