[websec] #32: HSTS: explain some practical implications of includeSubDomains directive
"websec issue tracker" <trac+websec@trac.tools.ietf.org> Wed, 28 December 2011 22:47 UTC
Return-Path: <trac+websec@trac.tools.ietf.org>
X-Original-To: websec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: websec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E6DA221F84B3 for <websec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 28 Dec 2011 14:47:25 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -102.599
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 11B84dznffBS for <websec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 28 Dec 2011 14:47:25 -0800 (PST)
Received: from gamay.tools.ietf.org (gamay.tools.ietf.org [208.66.40.242]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 63FD621F84B2 for <websec@ietf.org>; Wed, 28 Dec 2011 14:47:25 -0800 (PST)
Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=gamay.tools.ietf.org) by gamay.tools.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.77) (envelope-from <trac+websec@trac.tools.ietf.org>) id 1Rg2Gs-0004F1-0l; Wed, 28 Dec 2011 17:46:54 -0500
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
From: websec issue tracker <trac+websec@trac.tools.ietf.org>
X-Trac-Version: 0.12.2
Precedence: bulk
Auto-Submitted: auto-generated
X-Mailer: Trac 0.12.2, by Edgewall Software
To: draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec@tools.ietf.org, jeff.hodges@kingsmountain.com
X-Trac-Project: websec
Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2011 22:46:53 -0000
X-URL: http://tools.ietf.org/websec/
X-Trac-Ticket-URL: http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/32
Message-ID: <070.b5e0cfa5b3a6fe7add2652f951e3143f@trac.tools.ietf.org>
X-Trac-Ticket-ID: 32
X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: ::1
X-SA-Exim-Rcpt-To: draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec@tools.ietf.org, jeff.hodges@kingsmountain.com, websec@ietf.org
X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: trac+websec@trac.tools.ietf.org
X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on gamay.tools.ietf.org); SAEximRunCond expanded to false
Resent-To:
Resent-Message-Id: <20111228224725.63FD621F84B2@ietfa.amsl.com>
Resent-Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2011 14:47:25 -0800
Resent-From: trac+websec@trac.tools.ietf.org
Cc: websec@ietf.org
Subject: [websec] #32: HSTS: explain some practical implications of includeSubDomains directive
X-BeenThere: websec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
List-Id: Web Application Security Minus Authentication and Transport <websec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/websec>, <mailto:websec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/websec>
List-Post: <mailto:websec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:websec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/websec>, <mailto:websec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2011 22:47:26 -0000
#32: HSTS: explain some practical implications of includeSubDomains directive the includeSubDomains directive has some practical implications -- for example, if a HSTS host offers http-based services on various ports, then they will all have to be TLS/SSL-based in order to work properly. For example, certification authorities often offer their CRL distribution and OCSP services over plain HTTP, and sometimes at a subdomain of a publicly-available web application which may be secured by TLS/SSL. E.g. https://example-ca.com/ is a publicly-available web application for "Example CA", a certification authority. Customers use this web application to register their public keys and obtain certificates. Example CA generates certificates for customers containing <http://crl-and-ocsp .example-ca.com/> as the value for the "CRL Distribution Points" and "Authority Information Access:OCSP" certificate fields. If example-ca.com were to issue an HSTS Policy with the includeSubDomains directive, then HTTP-based user agents implementing HSTS, and that have interacted with the example-ca.com web application, would fail to retrieve CRLs and fail to check OCSP for certificates because these services are offered over plain HTTP. In this case, Example CA can either.. * not use the includeSubDomains directive, or, * ensure HTTP-based services offered at subdomains of example-ca.com are uniformly offered over TLS/SSL, or, * offer plain HTTP-based services at a different domain name, e.g. example-ca-services.net. -- -------------------------+------------------------------------------------- Reporter: | Owner: draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport- jeff.hodges@… | sec@… Type: defect | Status: new Priority: minor | Milestone: Component: strict- | Version: transport-sec | Keywords: Severity: Active WG | Document | -------------------------+------------------------------------------------- Ticket URL: <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/32> websec <http://tools.ietf.org/websec/>
- [websec] #32: HSTS: explain some practical implic… websec issue tracker
- Re: [websec] #32: HSTS: explain some practical im… websec issue tracker