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Re: [websec] #53: Clarify status of pin validation when used with private trust anchors

Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> Tue, 28 May 2013 12:12 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: Tobias Gondrom <tobias.gondrom@gondrom.org>
Thread-Topic: [websec] #53: Clarify status of pin validation when used with private trust anchors
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Date: Tue, 28 May 2013 12:11:54 +0000
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Cc: "<websec@ietf.org>" <websec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [websec] #53: Clarify status of pin validation when used with private trust anchors
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I agree. I think that this non-strict behavior is something that UAs will implement anyway, because otherwise the UA doesn't work in any place that has a "next generation firewall" (which is pretty much any firewall these days)

And if they did stick to only strict behavior, pretty much none of the potential servers would use HPKP. 

I agree that this text represents a middle ground that allows both UAs and servers to deploy the protocol.

so, +1.

Yoav
(with no hats, except maybe a next-generation firewall vendor hat)

On May 28, 2013, at 2:35 PM, Tobias Gondrom <tobias.gondrom@gondrom.org> wrote:

> Hi Chris,
> 
> I think so. (but am not 100% sure.)
> Any other comments on this issue before we close it?
> 
> Thanks, Tobias
> 
> 
> On 25/05/13 02:41, websec issue tracker wrote:
>> #53: Clarify status of pin validation when used with private trust anchors
>> 
>> 
>> Comment (by palmer@google.com):
>> 
>> The current draft has this text:
>> 
>>  578 <t>If the connection has no errors, then the UA will determine
>> whether to
>>  579 apply a new, additional correctness check: Pin Validation. A UA
>> SHOULD
>>  580 perform Pin Validation whenever connecting to a Known Pinned Host,
>> but MAY
>>  581 allow Pin Validation to be disabled for Hosts according to local
>> policy. For
>>  582 example, a UA may disable Pin Validation for Pinned Hosts whose
>> validated
>>  583 certificate chain terminates at a user-defined trust anchor, rather
>> than a
>>  584 trust anchor built-in to the UA. However, if the Pinned Host Metadata
>>  585 indicates that the Pinned Host is operating in "strict mode" (see
>>  586 <xref target="strict"/>), then the UA MUST perform Pin
>> Validation.</t>
>> 
>> I believe this is the result of previous consensus. Is that correct, and
>> can I therefore close this issue?
>> 
> 
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