Re: [websec] #58: Should we pin only SPKI, or also names

[Yoav Nir <[e-mail]>]

On Aug 7, 2013, at 1:14 PM, Trevor Perrin <[e-mail]> wrote:

> On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 2:55 AM, Gervase Markham <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> On 07/08/13 10:45, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>>> Presumably the browser would have a table mapping names to key lists,
>>> and would evaluate a site's cert chain by checking for an intersection
>>> with all relevant keys in the pin (direct or indirect).
>> 
>> Yes; this would need to be metadata associated with each cert in the
>> root store. It would need to be added when roots were added.
> 
> I was imagining a table which is indexed by CA names, and which maps a
> CA name to a corresponding list of key hashes.  These hashes might
> correspond to certs in the root store or they might not (e.g., they
> might correspond to intermediates).
> 
> Only CAs which had "opted-in" and provided the requisite info to
> browsers would be in the table.

I'm only wondering where I get a copy of that table and who maintains it. Having a different one maintained by each browser vendor IMO makes the Internet worse, not better. So do we have a volunteer to maintain it, maintain a stable link to it, receive updates from numerous new and old certificate vendors, and verify those updates with the browser vendors (so you can't register a new CA in the list if you aren't also trying to get in listed in the browser verndors' lists of trusted CAs.

BTW: it's OK to pin to trust anchors, but it also works to pin to the leaf public key (with a "spare" public key to be used in the next certificate). Surprisingly, pinning to intermediate CAs combines the worst of both options (out of your control like the CA, and changes often like the end entity)

Yoav