Re: [websec] Issue #41 add parameter indicating whether to hardfail or not

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Fri, 29 June 2012 14:30 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 07:29:28 -0700
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To: =JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@kingsmountain.com>
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Cc: IETF WebSec WG <websec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [websec] Issue #41 add parameter indicating whether to hardfail or not
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On Tue, Jun 12, 2012 at 12:00 AM, =JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@kingsmountain.com> wrote:
> Hi, thanks for your thoughts Yoav, apologies for latency,
>
>> I guess my issue with this..
>
> ..where "this" is denying the user the capability to "click-through" TLS/SSL
> errors/warnings in all error cases..
>
>> ..is because when I read the draft for the first
>> time, I thought this would be a good idea for websites that only do HTTPS
>> and
>> do not do HTTP except to redirect to HTTPS. I thought it would allow them
>> to
>> signal this information, and allow them to defeat HTTP-based MiTM attacks.
>
> Yes, that is exactly the benefit the spec provides.
>
>
>> The
>> draft as it stands is not a good fit for this use case, because it
>> requires
>> more of the administrator than is currently reasonable to expect.
>
> If an admin is uncertain about their keeping their TLS/SSL certificate
> deployment up-to-date, then they shouldn't declare themselves as an HSTS
> Host.
>
> And, they shouldn't have themselves listed on Chrome's HSTS pre-loaded list,
> nor the upcoming Firefox one.
>
>
>> I could propose an "HSTS-light" header for this use case, but I don't
>> think
>> anybody would like to have that.
>
> Yeah, I'm not sure that's necessary, because what we're talking about here
> really is whether the user is offered obvious recourse to proceed with
> loading the web app in the face of TLS/SSL errors -- i.e., to be allowed to
> "click through" -- and in most (all?) browsers, the user is allowed to
> recourse to click through many TLS/SSL errors. So in some sense it is the
> status quo for a plain old non-HSTS web app.
>
>
> In the Paris WG session, the discussion of the above morphed to thinking
> about having a new "this site is testing HSTS" directive.
>
> In thinking about this, we don't think it is really necessary because if one
> declares one's web app as being HSTS, one can watch server logs to see if
> any requests come in over plain http, and then go track those issues down.

The point of "this is testing" is  the opposite: people who can't talk to you
because you've configured HSTS in a way inconsistent with your actual
site posture.

-Ekr