Re: [websec] #58: Should we pin only SPKI, or also names

Gervase Markham <gerv@mozilla.org> Wed, 07 August 2013 09:55 UTC

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Date: Wed, 07 Aug 2013 10:55:14 +0100
From: Gervase Markham <gerv@mozilla.org>
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To: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
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Cc: websec <websec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [websec] #58: Should we pin only SPKI, or also names
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On 07/08/13 10:45, Trevor Perrin wrote:
> Presumably the browser would have a table mapping names to key lists,
> and would evaluate a site's cert chain by checking for an intersection
> with all relevant keys in the pin (direct or indirect).

Yes; this would need to be metadata associated with each cert in the
root store. It would need to be added when roots were added.

What happens if a CA requests a change to this mapping? This might
violate the expectations of some users as to which keys they were pinning.

Gerv