[websec] Forwarded review of draft-williams-websec-session-continue-prob-00

Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> Mon, 14 January 2013 17:05 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: IETF WebSec WG <websec@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Forwarded review of draft-williams-websec-session-continue-prob-00
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Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2013 17:05:31 +0000
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Subject: [websec] Forwarded review of draft-williams-websec-session-continue-prob-00
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I've shown this draft to a co-worker of mine (not on this list), and asked for a review. Here's some comments:

- Overall, this is an interesting problem. 

- The document is missing a list of deficiencies with using Cookies

- Section 2.1 says that TLS protects against replay. Really?  How? It doesn't have a protected counter like IPsec.

- Will the resulting protocol support a transition from authenticated session to authenticated session for purposes such as re-authenticating after a specified time, or moving from weak authentication to strong authentication for high-value transactions.

Nit: HTTP is HyperText **Transfer** Protocol, not **Transport*.  This one is already fixed in Nico's repository.