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From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>
Date: Sat, 11 Aug 2012 23:37:52 +0300
Thread-Topic: [saag] [websec] Pinning
Thread-Index: Ac14AS5KvY5+O10lTRm44RvftP/6Qg==
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Cc: Chris Evans <cevans@google.com>, IETF WebSec WG <websec@ietf.org>,
 Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>,
 Moxie Marlinspike <moxie@thoughtcrime.org>
Subject: Re: [websec] [saag]  Pinning
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Hi Chris

I've removed SAAG from CC, trimmed most of your message, and re-arranged th=
e rest. Hope you don't mind=85

On Aug 11, 2012, at 1:20 AM, Chris Palmer wrote:

> Additionally, HPKP and TACK might converge, more or less. I have plans
> to publish a new HPKP I-D that borrows some of TACK's pin activation
> and expiration ideas, for example.

<hat type=3D"chair">

Just as a reminder, HPKP is now a working group draft. As such, change cont=
rol is with the WG. Changes that change the rules for activation and expira=
tion should be proposed and discussed on the list first.=20

Having said that, we are pretty far from last call on key-pinning, so I thi=
nk it would be OK to publish a version -03 with such proposed changes, as l=
ong as those changes are clearly marked as not being the result of WG conse=
nsus.
</hat>

As an individual, I understand the limitations of the "spare public key" ap=
proach of the current HPKP. It's an administrative hassle to generate n spa=
re keys and keep them safe, and if you have n+1 key compromise events withi=
n the max-age time, your site is blocked. But it does have the big advantag=
e that the server side can be deployed *now* with no additional software. U=
ntil I see how those borrowed ideas can help with these issues, I prefer HP=
KP.

> So ultimately I do think we should decide on either HPKP or TACK, but
> that we should make that decision after there has been some real-world
> deployment experience with both (or, sadly, real-world non-deployment
> of one or both).

Well, there's WG deciding, and there's the market deciding. The IETF can pu=
blish both approaches (as either proposed standard or experimental) and the=
 one (if any) that the market prefers can later be upgraded to standard (or=
 it can stay at proposed anyway)

Yoav=
