Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url
Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> Sat, 11 September 2021 03:59 UTC
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To: Sergio Garcia Murillo <sergio.garcia.murillo@gmail.com>,
Juliusz Chroboczek <jch@irif.fr>
Cc: WISH List <wish@ietf.org>
References: <CA+ag07bjtS1Ucw1BZ5qQ_jJFfXbfQ3-hzDgxfkV1APhV1JZMnQ@mail.gmail.com>
<87o893vuz4.wl-jch@irif.fr>
<CA+ag07Y41bg_K-60=d5yyODj+bN442enQn-Grb-NkX7zQ8vVBQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
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Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 22:58:54 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url
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This is OAUTH, right? They might be different servers, but I would expect them to be the same audience (as OAUTH uses that term) -- implying that the same token would be applicable to both of them (if my understanding is correct). My relatively strong preference is to specify that the same token is used for the requests; and, that being the case, it's not clear what additional security properties you gain by putting a token in the URL path (but I'm not, strictly speaking, opposed to it -- I just don't see the value). /a On 9/10/2021 2:24 AM, Sergio Garcia Murillo wrote: > The second method (returning an unique url) could be detailed on the > security considerations, but sending the same authentication bearer > token in both requests should be in the normative part. > > Somehow, I don't like any of both ideas, sending the same token in > both requests doesn't feel appropriate as the idea is that the whip > endpoint and the whip resource could be in different servers, so the > token for the PATH/DELETE request is most probably irrelevant for the > media server. > > But returning an unique url doesn't seem a very secure idea. Anyway, > if anyone could get access to the resource url. On the other hand, if > an attacker has access to the url in the http response, it would most > probably have access to the data in the request (i.e. the token). > > What do you think? > Sergio > > El mié, 8 sept 2021 a las 19:27, Juliusz Chroboczek (<jch@irif.fr > <mailto:jch@irif.fr>>) escribió: > > > I think we have the following options: > > - Use the same mechanism/info as the initial request to the > whip url (i.e. > > sending the Authentication header with the same bearer token) > > - Returning a randomized opaque unique url > > - Allow using both? > > I think this is better left unspecified in the normative part of the > document, but should be explained in detail in the Security > Considerations > section or in an informative appendix. > > -- Juliusz > >
- [Wish] Authentication for resource url Sergio Garcia Murillo
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Lorenzo Miniero
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Juliusz Chroboczek
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Sergio Garcia Murillo
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Adam Roach
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Sergio Garcia Murillo
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Adam Roach
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Matt Ward
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Adam Roach
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Juliusz Chroboczek
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Sergio Garcia Murillo
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Matt Ward
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Sergio Garcia Murillo
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Matt Ward
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Sergio Garcia Murillo
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Matt Ward
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Cameron Elliott
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Juliusz Chroboczek
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Sergio Garcia Murillo
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Sergio Garcia Murillo
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Sergio Garcia Murillo
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Juliusz Chroboczek
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Sergio Garcia Murillo
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Juliusz Chroboczek
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Adam Roach
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Juliusz Chroboczek
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Juliusz Chroboczek
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Lorenzo Miniero
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Christer Holmberg
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Adam Roach
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Juliusz Chroboczek
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Juliusz Chroboczek
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Adam Roach
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Adam Roach
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Matt Ward
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Sergio Garcia Murillo
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Matt Ward
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Sergio Garcia Murillo
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Lorenzo Miniero
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Juliusz Chroboczek
- Re: [Wish] Authentication for resource url Spencer Dawkins at IETF