Re: [wpkops] Preliminary Next Version of Browser Behavior Draft

Gervase Markham <gerv@mozilla.org> Wed, 04 June 2014 21:38 UTC

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Date: Wed, 04 Jun 2014 20:54:07 +0100
From: Gervase Markham <gerv@mozilla.org>
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Subject: Re: [wpkops] Preliminary Next Version of Browser Behavior Draft
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Hi Ben,

On 27/05/14 22:12, Ben Wilson wrote:
> Here is another draft with suggested changes from Santosh accepted, and
> the addition of “Security Considerations” subsections, based on our
> discussions of May 13^th .

Sorry if I'm missing context here, but the intro to the document
suggests that it's documentation of observed browser behaviour (i.e. a
record of reality), but then as early as section 1.4 it starts by saying
browsers "should" do X or Y. E.g.:

"A browser should only use its trust anchor store to determine the trust
anchor for a Server’s certification path."

Taking this particular statement as an example: what happens if the
browser wants to use the OS store? Or both its own and the OSes? Or a
remote store with auto-download such as Windows uses?

To take another example from 1.4: "Specifically, the browser should be
able to use unsecure HTTP and unsecure LDAP method." I can confidently
say that we have no plans to reintroduce LDAP fetching to Firefox, and
the publication of an RFC would be unlikely (British understatement) to
change that. (We are also pretty unlikely to do caIssuers chasing, but I
am 0.1% less adamant about that.)

As more constructive input: many of the behaviours you note are features
of the underlying SSL implementation rather than the browser. This is, I
believe, why Chrome and Safari on OS X don't do name constraints (they
use the system SSL library) but Firefox does (which uses NSS). I agree
it's difficult because the exact user experience _is_ defined by the
individual browsers. But the document might be easier to understand and
follow if you acknowledged the connection with the library being used.

Gerv