Re: [XCON] AD review: draft-ietf-xcon-ccmp-10

Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com> Tue, 07 December 2010 20:43 UTC

Return-Path: <rjsparks@nostrum.com>
X-Original-To: xcon@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: xcon@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0F35D28C0DC for <xcon@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 7 Dec 2010 12:43:48 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -102.484
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.484 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.116, BAYES_00=-2.599, SPF_PASS=-0.001, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 967bYjK+Vv8q for <xcon@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 7 Dec 2010 12:43:47 -0800 (PST)
Received: from nostrum.com (nostrum-pt.tunnel.tserv2.fmt.ipv6.he.net [IPv6:2001:470:1f03:267::2]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 65E2B3A6899 for <xcon@ietf.org>; Tue, 7 Dec 2010 12:43:46 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [192.168.2.105] (pool-173-71-48-4.dllstx.fios.verizon.net [173.71.48.4]) (authenticated bits=0) by nostrum.com (8.14.3/8.14.3) with ESMTP id oB7KjAFs057041 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NO); Tue, 7 Dec 2010 14:45:10 -0600 (CST) (envelope-from rjsparks@nostrum.com)
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v1082)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
From: Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com>
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTinXKV-eCmpuDWUfm0ZGX6c4+YNxoF95G84gUSzc@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2010 14:45:10 -0600
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <58C6B9FF-CE36-4D1C-8165-59697707A330@nostrum.com>
References: <DE53D7D6-7FC6-445F-8500-FDE234681FA3@nostrum.com> <AANLkTinXKV-eCmpuDWUfm0ZGX6c4+YNxoF95G84gUSzc@mail.gmail.com>
To: Mary Barnes <mary.ietf.barnes@gmail.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1082)
Received-SPF: pass (nostrum.com: 173.71.48.4 is authenticated by a trusted mechanism)
Cc: xcon@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [XCON] AD review: draft-ietf-xcon-ccmp-10
X-BeenThere: xcon@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Centralized Conferencing <xcon.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/xcon>, <mailto:xcon-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xcon>
List-Post: <mailto:xcon@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:xcon-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/xcon>, <mailto:xcon-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2010 20:43:48 -0000

I reviewed the diffs between -10 and -11 (while waiting for -12).

All of my concerns have been addressed except for the AUTO_GENERATE text that
you intend to add and  what's called out below:

>> 
>> * Can you add a note explaining that the server chooses the contents
>>  of the URI when it creates a conference or user? The examples for
>>  creating users, such as 6.7, imply that some bits (Ciccio in this case)
>>  are copied from the request's userInfo into the response's userInfo
>>  AUTO_GENERATEd URI. While a server might choose to do something like
>>  that, it's not required to.
> [MB] A note has been added with regards to the server choosing the
> XCON-USERID. Not sure that addresses your second concern. [/MB]

Not completely, but I don't think any more text is needed. My concern is
that an implementer or system designer would come away thinking that
the right way to code populating the auto-generated URI would be to take
the mailto: or sip: URI you provided and just change the scheme.


>> 
>> * The security considerations section should call out that most CCMP commands
>>  can pend indefinitely - clients need to be ready to wait an arbitrary amount
>>  of time to get the response (see section 6.3 of xcon-examples and consider
>>  Alice not responding and the IVR not timing out, Alice using an automaton
>>  to keep the IVR from completing its script when it did have timeout protection,
>>  etc. The document should say what a client should do when it is no longer
>>  willing to wait (close the underlying connection?), and point out what
>>  servers can do if they have lots of pending requests starting to pile up.
> [MB] Added text to the 6th item on DoS attacks in the security section
> - not sure if that's the exact right place, but hopefully the text
> addresses the concern. [/MB]

That's a good a place as any. The group should be sure to review the extra normative
statements you've added.


Thanks!

RjS