Re: [xml2rfc-dev] cryptographic signatures over xml2rfc releases should not be made with SHA1

[Robert Sparks <[e-mail]>]

Hi Daniel -

You'll have seen that 3.6.0 was just released, and this comment has not 
yet been addressed.

It's on the list to deal with. I wanted to make sure you knew this 
wasn't being ignored.

RjS

On 2/18/21 3:40 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> Hi folks--
>
> I'm looking at the latest xml2rfc tarball and its OpenPGP signature:
>
> https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/c0/81/21281e78fd2afb8f5dfcb92b78c9dcd621081277304e0f25df0ee7c89c64/xml2rfc-3.5.0.tar.gz
> https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/c0/81/21281e78fd2afb8f5dfcb92b78c9dcd621081277304e0f25df0ee7c89c64/xml2rfc-3.5.0.tar.gz.asc
>
> The signature file (the *.asc) is made using SHA-1 for the signature:
>
>      $ pgpdump  < xml2rfc-3.5.0.tar.gz.asc
>      Old: Signature Packet(tag 2)(540 bytes)
>              Ver 4 - new
>              Sig type - Signature of a binary document(0x00).
>              Pub alg - RSA Encrypt or Sign(pub 1)
>              Hash alg - SHA1(hash 2)
>              Hashed Sub: signature creation time(sub 2)(4 bytes)
>                      Time - Wed Nov 18 05:20:56 EST 2020
>              Sub: issuer key ID(sub 16)(8 bytes)
>                      Key ID - 0x4E9B574B8FBB171A
>              Hash left 2 bytes - d2 9f
>              RSA m^d mod n(4094 bits) - ...
>                      -> PKCS-1
>      $
>
> Signatures using SHA-1 have been deprecated for over a decade now.  No
> modern tool should generate them.
>
>  From the Version: comment in the .asc file, it looks to me like these
> signatures are being generated from the old, deprecated "classic"
> version of GnuPG ("Version: GnuPG v1").
>
> Henrik (or whoever else might make a future release of xml2rfc), is
> there something blocking you from updating to a more modern OpenPGP
> implementation for making these signatures?  The GnuPG 2.2.x series
> ("modern") should make signatures with sha256 (or better) by default, as
> should pretty much any other OpenPGP implementation (sequoia,
> openpgp.js, gopenpgp, rnp, pgpainless, etc).  There's probably also a
> way to coax better-than-SHA-1 signatures out of GnuPG 1.x as well, but
> that toolkit is unable to deal with modern tooling like ECC keys so i
> recommend upgrading anyway.
>
> The irony here is that i'm trying to work on the RFC for OpenPGP itself
> to refresh the cryptographic requirements in that standard, and i'm
> working with modern tooling that deprecates SHA-1 signatures
> appropriately; and to update the xml2rfc package i want to check the
> OpenPGP signature, etc.  a nice little loop!
>
> I figure it's probably neither possible nor advisable to re-issue a
> signature over xml2rfc version 3.5.0, but if you can line it up so that
> signatures of future releases avoid using SHA1, that'd be great.
>
>                 --dkg
>
> PS The files i've fetched from the above URLs have this content (just in
>     case anyone wants to replicate, they can confirm that they're getting
>     the same thing):
>
> $ sha256sum *
> 3ec836a9545f549707a8c8176038160185b9d08c1dd80304a906527da21bff68  xml2rfc-3.5.0.tar.gz
> ef652fda6c1f7b63f22765e7df48d627ce529155f1bcb45a01e566687b4fd4eb  xml2rfc-3.5.0.tar.gz.asc
> $
>
>
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