Re: [Add] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-mglt-abcd-doh-privacy-analysis-00.txt

[Vittorio Bertola <[e-mail]>]

Il 6 novembre 2019 20:35 Bob Harold <[e-mail]> ha scritto:

On Wed, Nov 6, 2019 at 2:10 PM Tommy Jensen <Jensen.Thomas= [e-mail]> wrote:

As far as ill-behaved applications go, they were going to do whatever they wanted anyway, and pushing DoH adoption doesn't give them powers they didn't already have. At some point, the problem becomes one of the user needing to decide what apps they trust which we cannot help with via protocol design.

I agree with most of your points - but here you say "pushing DoH adoption doesn't give them powers they didn't already have".  One concern is IF some major web service enables DoH on a major web server, then that does make it very easy for apps to hide their DNS in a way they could not easily do before.

More generally, applications could already do their own DNS-over-whatever-type-of-encryption-and-obfuscation-protocol, but they would have to develop it on their own and also develop and run the related server. After standardizing DoH and getting it widely adopted, applications that want to reach that objective just need to deploy a readily available Web client library and use any of the many public servers - something that any script kiddie can do.

Note that this is less true of DoT, since DoT towards out-of-perimeter servers would more easily be detectable and blockable. This is why I have heard some cybersecurity people suggest that the industry should promote DoT rather than DoH, as they see it less likely that DoT will circumvent national cybersecurity practices and law enforcement mechanisms.

Regarding Daniel's draft, I appreciate the effort and I partly tried to do this and other analyses in my draft for Prague, but I then realized that there are people here that will never consent to such a document becoming an agreed standard, even if informational. So I suggest that we should focus on a few technical developments for interoperability purposes that we can agree upon, such as standardized ways for the local network to advertise their own Do* service and their use of it for local policy enforcement, and give up discussions on deployment models and human rights assessments. I don't think we could ever get to agreement here on whether DoH brings more privacy and freedom or less of it, as the answer is really "it depends".

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Vittorio Bertola | Head of Policy & Innovation, Open-Xchange
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