[Cfrg] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-03.txt

[Hugo Krawczyk <[e-mail]>]

I posted a revised version of the OPAQUE internet draft.

The only significant change is that forward secrecy is now a requirement
for the key exchange protocol underlying OPAQUE which means that three
messages are necessary (and sufficient) for OPAQUE. As I said in my
previous email regarding the new version of the OPAQUE paper, this does not
change anything in ways to integrate OPAQUE with TLS 1.3 or IKEv2. In
particular, no change to the analysis and conclusions  of such integration
as presented by CFRG teams is needed.

I also added an encryption-less option for EnvU. The motivation for this is
to provide an option that reduces server storage and communication in cases
this may be significant. It also dispenses with the need to assume
equivocable authenticated encryption, reducing the "idealized assumptions"
in the protocol analysis. On the other hand, encryption helps with transmitting
complex-to-generate  private keys (e.g., RSA) and to support applications
where the user may want  to use the envelope for retrieving additional
secrets. .

Hugo


---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: <[e-mail]>
Date: Sat, Oct 19, 2019 at 6:13 PM
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-03.txt
To: Hugo Krawczyk <[e-mail]>



A new version of I-D, draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-03.txt
has been successfully submitted by Hugo Krawczyk and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:           draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque
Revision:       03
Title:          The OPAQUE Asymmetric PAKE Protocol
Document date:  2019-10-21
Group:          Individual Submission
Pages:          22
URL:
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-03.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque/
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-03
Htmlized:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque
Diff:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-03

Abstract:
   This draft describes the OPAQUE protocol, a secure asymmetric
   password authenticated key exchange (aPAKE) that supports mutual
   authentication in a client-server setting without reliance on PKI and
   with security against pre-computation attacks upon server compromise.
   Prior aPAKE protocols did not use salt and if they did, the salt was
   transmitted in the clear from server to user allowing for the
   building of targeted pre-computed dictionaries.  OPAQUE security has
   been proven by Jarecki et al.  (Eurocrypt 2018) in a strong and
   universally composable formal model of aPAKE security.  In addition,
   the protocol provides forward secrecy and the ability to hide the
   password from the server even during password registration.

   Strong security, versatility through modularity, good performance,
   and an array of additional features make OPAQUE a natural candidate
   for practical use and for adoption as a standard.  To this end, this
   draft presents several optimized instantiations of OPAQUE and ways of
   integrating OPAQUE with TLS.

   This draft presents a high-level description of OPAQUE highlighting
   its components and modular design.  A detailed unambiguous
   specification for standardization will be presented in future
   revisions of this document, or separately.




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