Re: [conex] Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-conex-destopt-09: (with COMMENT)

[Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>]

Hiya,

On 06/10/15 00:43, Bob Briscoe wrote:
> 
> [Proposal #2]
> A network-based attacker could alter ConEx information to fool an audit
> function in a downstream network into discarding packets. However,
> otherexisting attacks from one network on another such a TTL expiry
> attacks are more damaging (because ConEx audit discards silently) and
> less traceable (because TTL is meant to change, whereas CDO is not).

That's better, yes.

Probably no need to address it in this document but I guess our
assumptions about other existing attacks might change as more and
more network traffic is ciphertext at various layers. I'm also
generally leery of arguments of the form "no need to do something
here as there's a worse thing there" since those encourage us to
do nothing anywhere, so I'd lose that kind of language if it can
be done.

S.