Re: [dispatch] Thoughts on draft-rosenbergjennings-dispatch-ripp-03
Jonathan Rosenberg <jdrosen@jdrosen.net> Mon, 22 July 2019 12:14 UTC
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From: Jonathan Rosenberg <jdrosen@jdrosen.net>
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2019 08:13:56 -0400
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To: "Roni Even (A)" <roni.even@huawei.com>
Cc: Eric Burger <eburger@standardstrack.com>, "dispatch@ietf.org" <dispatch@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [dispatch] Thoughts on draft-rosenbergjennings-dispatch-ripp-03
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Thanks Roni for the comments! Though quic overall is reliable, the way we’re using it achieves an interesting effect - there is no hol blocking. This means an actual IP loss would result in packet 1 showing up, then 3, then much later, 2. As a result, with hitter buffer, 2 is effectively lost and thus fec would be useful in recovering 2. Thx, Jonathan R. On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 7:16 AM Roni Even (A) <roni.even@huawei.com> wrote: > I agree with Eric’s comments. > > I was also wondering about the capabilities support. For example OPUS > supports in band FEC which addresses packet loss but if you use a reliable > transport it will lose the effectiveness of FEC. This is why there is some > discussion about unreliable streams. > > It look to me that replacing RTP is not as simple as you present in the > document. > > Roni Even > > > > *From:* dispatch [mailto:dispatch-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of *Eric > Burger > *Sent:* Monday, July 22, 2019 12:18 AM > *To:* dispatch@ietf.org > *Subject:* [dispatch] Thoughts on draft-rosenbergjennings-dispatch-ripp-03 > > > > General: For the most part, I like the idea of a draft that basically > says, “we tried to be pure but failed. This proposal is not pure but it for > the most part represents running code.” PHB will be happy (ref. the NAT > discussion on the IETF list). > > > > > > Section 1.1: background > > Will much of it be meaningful to a protocol implementer in a year, no less > five? I.e., referencing Kubernetes, Istio, CanaryDeploys, etc., more > especially without going into detail as to what they are? Sure, if you are > an AWS developer you know them like the back of your hand. However, not > many folks in IETF-land are. > > > > 1.2: > > Why is it ‘unfortunate’ that people want to deploy cloud applications that > interact with the PSTN? Is that not an opportunity? I would take out the > initial “Unfortunately.” It’s just a statement of fact that applications > like to call and be called to most any person on the planet on a fully > interoperable basis. > > > > There needs to be more justification than “Web people don’t understand > SIP.” You might want to explain how RIPP is different than ParlayX. I would > offer that RIPP:ParlayX::LDAP:X.500, but you don’t say that anywhere. All > the draft implies is Web people cannot grok SIP and SIP does not grok Web > deployment, which does not reflect well on either community. > > > > The last paragraph of 1.2 implies that SIP is the source of robocalls and > a mechanism that will be even easier to inject boatloads of calls will be > better. Please explain how this will be so (or remove the assertion). As > you know, I personally wish it would be so, so PLEASE give me ammunition! > > > > 1.4: > > Given the virtual mandate to use SIP over TCP, is saying “we can finally > use HTTP over UDP” not kind of a retrograde assertion? > > > > REQ 12 (supporting only audio) is an odd requirement. Moreover, most > applications in the U.S. would require at least RTT support if not video. I > am not a lawyer, but since we are talking interoperability with the PSTN, > one is likely to run into Section 255 and 706 issues if RTT (and video) is > not there from day one. > > > > REQ 13 looks totally duplicative of REQ 10 (use secure caller ID > technologies). Is there a distinction? If so, please make it clearer > > > > Section 3.6: > > This is a place where we need to distinguish between theory and reality. > In theory, SIP could provide end-to-end media security. In practice, no one > figured it out. The good news is RIPP is no worse than SIP as it is > deployed today. Moreover, RIPP is no worse than HTTP. My concern is RIPP > structurally will never have end-to-end media security. While that is no > worse than today, will we be running into some privacy expectations of > users and regulators? For example, a RIPP server can record everything. > Problems here are (1) in the U.S. that is likely to be a violation of the > Wiretap Act and (2) people can use those recordings for very nefarious > purposes (see RealTalk, Lyrebird, etc.). > > > > Section 8.2: > > Just curious: why MUST NOT the identifier included the authority component > for uniqueness? Is that a Web best practice? A reference or explanation > would be helpful. > > > > Section 8.3: > > What are the capabilities *of*? Are they codec parameters? Are they > decoded stream parameters? Are they codec dependent? Is there any value to > these parameters, outside parameterized codec negotiation that I am missing? > > > > For example, is the max-bitrate the decoded maximum bitrate or the bitrate > of the codec? What is the purpose? > > If I come up with a cool LPC that can do better than G.711 with 4000 > samples per section, why cannot I use it? > > > > BIG ONE: force-cbr > > Do we require a CBR codec or do we require uniform packet sizes (in > bytes)? If the former, why not just ask for a CBR codec in the request. If > the latter, change the parameter to something like “require privacy.” There > are much better ways of achieving privacy than using a CBR codec; see e.g., > https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1040699 > > > > Section 8.4: > > I agree with Cullen. It goes against the design principle of using HTTP/3 > for transport and then start putting application semantics into the > transport layer. Is there a reason to break layers, e.g., for load > balancing or something else? > > > > Section 8.7 > > Why 20 for forward and 10 for reverse? Are these rules of thumb, > calculated optimal places to start, SWAGs, or irrelevant? > > Also (and in Section 8.8), what about the speed of light and the > appearance of blocking? > > > > Section 8.8 > > Perhaps I missed it, but what happens if a byway appears to be blocked for > a ‘while’? Since this is voice and this is UDP and I am tolerant of packet > loss, do I care a packet was lost? Also, I’m highly skeptical of 1:1 > packet:ack this protocol offers. That sounds like a bad thing for LANs and > a terrible thing for WANs. Really? > > > > Section 8.10 > > I kind of agree with Cullen’s point, but here is an opposite observation > that I came up with before I saw Cullen’s point (that SIP result codes > don’t cover ISDN). Why have a separate ‘rejected’ result in light of > ‘failed.’ Unless rejected is referencing the SIP 607 result code, I would > think all the call center cares about is whether the call completed and if > it did not, will a retry be likely to succeed or fail. > > > > > > There are a ton of typos in the draft. I’d be happy to hand my mark-up to > whomever wants it in DISPATCH. > _______________________________________________ > dispatch mailing list > dispatch@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dispatch > -- Jonathan Rosenberg, Ph.D. jdrosen@jdrosen.net http://www.jdrosen.net
- [dispatch] Thoughts on draft-rosenbergjennings-di… Eric Burger
- Re: [dispatch] Thoughts on draft-rosenbergjenning… Roni Even (A)
- Re: [dispatch] Thoughts on draft-rosenbergjenning… Jonathan Rosenberg
- Re: [dispatch] Thoughts on draft-rosenbergjenning… Jonathan Rosenberg
- Re: [dispatch] Thoughts on draft-rosenbergjenning… Eric Burger