Re: [dispatch] Updating DKIM for stronger crypto

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Tue, 21 March 2017 14:33 UTC

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To: John R Levine <johnl@taugh.com>, DISPATCH list <dispatch@ietf.org>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [dispatch] Updating DKIM for stronger crypto
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On 21/03/17 14:05, John R Levine wrote:
> 
> If someone wanted to write something about key lifetimes with a way to
> poison keys by publishing them, that would be OK with me but I wouldn't
> want to put it into the DKIM spec.  Currently it offers no advice on key
> rotation beyond noting that it's possible, and no useful advice on key
> sizes.

Fully agree - were this to be done it ought be in it's
own document. Personally, I'd be willing to help with it,
but only if someone was likely to use it. (And so far,
nobody is afaik.)

S.