Re: [DNSOP] CDS and multi-provider DNSSEC

Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com> Sat, 23 March 2019 23:00 UTC

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From: Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 24 Mar 2019 00:00:04 +0100
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To: Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] CDS and multi-provider DNSSEC
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On Fri, Feb 1, 2019 at 1:35 PM Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at>; wrote:

> I'm working on tools for KSK rollover automation at the moment.
>
> It turns out that CDS records are very useful even if your parent zone
> doesn't check them.
>
> KSK rolls work better when the DS records are not simply generated from
> the current DNSKEY RRset. You need to be a bit more clever if you want to
> minimize interactions with the parent zone, or minimize the DNSKEY RRset
> size, or do an algorithm rollover.
>
> So your tool for setting DS records needs some way to ask the key store
> what DS records should be. The nice thing about CDS records is that they
> provide a standard way to do this, independent of the key store or signing
> software. This allows registrar API clients to be decoupled from the
> DNSSEC implementation.
>
> This makes me wonder how well this observation generalizes to
> multi-provider DNSSEC.
>

Sorry for answering this message so late. I'm in Prague for IETF104 and
am gradually catching myself up with miscellaneous mailing lists ..


> In model 1, the zone owner manages the KSK, so all the CDS/DS logic
> remains centralized.
>

Yes, that's true.

However, for automated CDS->DS updates, the zone owner still needs
to propagate the CDS (or CDNSKEY) down to each of the signing providers.
Since CDS/CDNSKEY are signed by an active KSK (that is managed by the
zone owner), the providers will still likely need to provide an API that
allows a
signed CDS/CDNSKEY RRset to be pushed to them. This is analogous to how
the current draft requires them to support an API mechanism to have a signed
DNSKEY RRset pushed to them.

In model 2, each DNS provider has its own KSK, and does its own DNSKEY
> RRset management. In order to support CDS/CDNSKEY, I think it is necessary
> for each provider to (somehow) generate RRsets that are the union of their
> CDS/CDNSKEY RRsets and the other provider's.
>
> In normal cases, I think the "somehow" involves getting the other
> provider's RRset, replacing any records corresponding to this provider's
> keys with what this provider thinks they should be, and retaining any
> records for unknown keys (which presumably belong to the other provider).
> There's a mildly awkward risk of zombie records that are copied back and
> forth despite neither provider knowing about them, but I suppose that can
> be fixed manually if it arises. Or maybe it's simpler if this is done via
> an API, like ZSK sharing :-)
>

I am in agreement with your last statement. We might as well extend the ZSK
sharing API to also include CDS/CDNSKEY sharing.

The risk of potential zombie records also exists with the DNSKEY RRset, and
I
expect that would be addressed by active management by the zone owner. Or,
post bootstrapping, active pollling of providers by one another.

Shumon