[DNSOP] Re: threat model for draft-ietf-dnsop-domain-verification-techniques
Ángel González <angel@16bits.net> Wed, 21 January 2026 03:42 UTC
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From: Ángel González <angel@16bits.net>
To: dnsop@ietf.org
Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2026 04:41:54 +0100
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Subject: [DNSOP] Re: threat model for draft-ietf-dnsop-domain-verification-techniques
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Hi Erik Section 7.10 mentions a new domain owner reintroducing an old validation record to make an old Application Service believe that an old user is still active. I miss however the opposite case: the new domain owner signs up into the Service, but the Application Service Provider actually treats it as a reactivation of the Service that was available back with the previous owner, allowing the old domain owner to access to the service of the new owner. Regards
- [DNSOP] threat model for draft-ietf-dnsop-domain-… Erik Nygren
- [DNSOP] Re: threat model for draft-ietf-dnsop-dom… Ángel González