[DNSOP] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-ds-automation-02 (Ends 2026-01-30)

"Hollenbeck, Scott" <shollenbeck@verisign.com> Tue, 27 January 2026 16:13 UTC

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From: "Hollenbeck, Scott" <shollenbeck@verisign.com>
To: "shuque@gmail.com" <shuque@gmail.com>, "dnsop-chairs@ietf.org" <dnsop-chairs@ietf.org>, "dnsop@ietf.org" <dnsop@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-dnsop-ds-automation@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-dnsop-ds-automation@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [EXTERNAL] [DNSOP] WG Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-ds-automation-02 (Ends 2026-01-30)
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Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2026 16:13:14 +0000
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Subject: [DNSOP] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-ds-automation-02 (Ends 2026-01-30)
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The document is in good shape. Section 4 discusses "Registration Locks", and cites RFC 5731. I agree with the recommendations, but the analysis is missing a key point from Section 2.3 of 5731. As stated there:

"A server MAY alter or override status values set by a client, subject to local server policies.  The status of an object MAY change as a result of either a client-initiated transform command or an action performed by a server operator."

Automated DNSSEC delegation trust maintenance may well be part of a server policy. These statements make it very clear that a server operator can override client-set status values subject to local server policies, and as such I think it would be helpful to note this text from 5731 in Section 4.2.2 of the draft. I also think it would be very helpful to add text that describes what a registry server operator should do if they perform an update that overrides a client-set status value. A server operator that supports EPP could notify a client using the message polling service described in Section 2.9.2.3 of RFC 5730. Perhaps something like this could be added as the last paragraph in Section 4.2.2:

"Section 2.3 of RFC 5731 [RFC5731] explicitly notes that an EPP server operator may override status values set by a client, subject to local server policies. There is, however, a risk of confusion if the server operator performs actions that override the status values set by a client. This risk can be mitigated by informing the client of automated actions taken buy the server using the polling service described in Section 2.9.2.3 of RFC 5730 [RFC5730]."

Scott