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Re: [Emu] Review of draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-04

John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com> Mon, 25 March 2019 05:22 UTC

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From: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
To: 'EMU WG' <emu@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Emu] Review of draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-04
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Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 05:22:11 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/emu/ESLS7oBFPT-3LdvR9zNDvQK1hjY>
Subject: Re: [Emu] Review of draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-04
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Jim Schaad wrote:

>> I suggest writing:
>> 
>> TLS 1.3 introduced early application data which is not used in EAP-TLS. A
>> server which receives an "early_data" extension MUST ignore the extension
>> or respond with a HelloRetryRequest as described in Section 4.2.10 of RFC
>> 8446.
>
> That is better, an additional note that new session tickets MUST NOT include the early data extension would also be relevant.

I don't think this sentence works... according to Figure 3 of RFC 8446, the TLS server (but not the TLS client) can send early data even if the client did not provide a early_data extension. The text in RFC 8446 says very little about the [Application Data*] from the TLS server....

          Client                                               Server

   Initial Handshake:
          ClientHello
          + key_share               -------->
                                                          ServerHello
                                                          + key_share
                                                {EncryptedExtensions}
                                                {CertificateRequest*}
                                                       {Certificate*}
                                                 {CertificateVerify*}
                                                           {Finished}
                                    <--------     [Application Data*]
          {Certificate*}
          {CertificateVerify*}
          {Finished}                -------->
                                    <--------      [NewSessionTicket]
          [Application Data]        <------->      [Application Data]

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