Re: [Gen-art] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-httpbis-origin-frame-04

Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> Tue, 28 November 2017 00:33 UTC

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From: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
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Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 11:33:27 +1100
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To: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-httpbis-origin-frame-04
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Thanks again. Please see:
  https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/commit/871a80d12aa


> On 27 Nov 2017, at 1:05 pm, Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi Mark,
> 
> On 27/11/2017 12:38, Mark Nottingham wrote:
>> Hi Brian,
>> 
>> Thanks for the review. Responses below.
>> 
>>> On 26 Nov 2017, at 2:44 pm, Brian Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com> wrote:
>> [...]
>>> Minor Issues:
>>> -------------
>>> 
>>>> 2.1.  Syntax
>>> ...
>>>> Origin: An OPTIONAL sequence of characters ... that the
>>>> sender believes this connection is or could be authoritative for.
>>> 
>>> So, that implies that all data in the ORIGIN frame might be false.
>>> Doesn't that deserve a bit of a health warning at the beginning of the
>>> Security Considerations?
>> 
>> The first paragraph of SC is already:
>> 
>> """
>>   Clients that blindly trust the ORIGIN frame's contents will be
>>   vulnerable to a large number of attacks.  See Section 2.4 for mitigations.
>> """
>> 
>> What would you suggest?
>> 
>>> Also, using the word "believes" of a server
>>> is strange. How would the server acquire uncertain knowledge in the
>>> first place, and what algorithm would decide what it "believes"?
>> 
>> This is to emphasise that ORIGIN is advisory only -- it does not constitute proof (crypto does that).
> 
> Right. But I think it's the anthropomorphic choice of word that triggered me. If you said "that the sender asserts this connection is or could be authoritative for" I think I'd have nothing further to say, since it's clearly an assertion that needs to be checked.
> 
>> 
>>> Appendix A doesn't show any sign of a client checking whether an
>>> Origin-Entry is real.
>> 
>> As per Section 2.4, it isn't checked when the origin set is created or updated; it's checked when the value is used.
> 
> OK
> 
>> 
>> 
>>>> 2.3.  The Origin Set
>>> ...
>>>> o  Host: the value sent in Server Name Indication (SNI, [RFC6066]
>>>>    Section 3), converted to lower case
>>> 
>>> In that reference:
>>> 
>>>>> Literal IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are not permitted in "HostName".
>>> 
>>> Is that an intended or unintended restriction for the ORIGIN frame?
>>> In any case it should probably be mentioned explicitly to avoid confusion.
>>> (If IPv6 literals were allowed, they might be very convenient for server
>>> load balancing. But RFC6066 excludes that.)
>> 
>> Good catch. I don't think there's cause for confusion here (the text there isn't about what can go on the wire), but there is a corner case we haven't covered (when a client that supports SNI omits it because it's an IP literal). 
>> 
>> My inclination there is to say that the host is the SNI value or the server IP if SNI is missing; what do people think?
> 
>> From this reviewer's peanut gallery seat, that makes sense.
> 
>   Brian
> 
>> 
>> Cheers,
>> 
>> --
>> Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/
>> 
>> 

--
Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/