Re: [Gen-art] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-arch-18

Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> Thu, 21 February 2019 03:09 UTC

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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 22:09:00 -0500
Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-arch.all@ietf.org, rtcweb@ietf.org, ietf@ietf.org
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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-arch-18
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I generated PR for these:
https://github.com/rtcweb-wg/security-arch/pull/85

> On Feb 9, 2019, at 13:50, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>; wrote:
> 
> Reviewer: Russ Housley
> Review result: Almost Ready
> 
> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
> Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
> by the IESG for the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just
> like any other last call comments.
> 
> For more information, please see the FAQ at
> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>;.
> 
> Document: draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-arch-18
> Reviewer: Russ Housley
> Review Date: 2019-02-07
> IETF LC End Date: 2019-02-15
> IESG Telechat date: unknown
> 
> Summary: Almost Ready
> 
> 
> Major Concerns:
> 
> Section 4.1 says "... preferably over TLS ...", but it does not tell
> what the consequences are if TLS is not used.  Since this is the
> security architecture, I would expect these consequences to be
> described.

There is s9.1 that addresses this :)

> Section 4.2: Please add a sentence or two that defines Interactive
> Connectivity Establishment (ICE) data and non-ICE data.

Since s4.2 of this document points to s4.2 of security-arch and there’s an entire subsection on ICE I am hoping that the references are enough.

> Section 6.5 includes a contradiction.  One place it says, " MUST NOT
> negotiate cipher suites with NULL encryption", and another place it
> says, "if Null ciphers are used ...".  Please make these consistent.

I deleted the display requirements section because I think the prohibiting on negotiating NULL drives the display requirement.

> Section 6.5 requires implementation of certificate fingerprints or a
> Short Authentication String (SAS).  Please add a sentence to tell how
> they are used to provide out-of-band verification.  Without such a
> sentence, it is easy to imagine an implementation with a UI that is
> too awkward to actually get the information on the screen while the
> call is in progress.

Would something like this work:

  These are compared by the peers to authenticate one another.

> Section 10: since this is a standards track document, the IESG should
> be responsible for this new codepoint, not the document author.

changed

> Minor Concerns:
> 
> Section 3.1 uses https://www.evil.org/ as an example.  However, this is
> a registered domain.  It would be better to follow the IESG statement on
> examples: https://www6.ietf.org/iesg/statement/examples.html.

I was really hoping a Dr. Evil included their info the DNS.  It wasn’t there.
I changed to http://example.org

> Section 6.2 uses customerservice@ford.com  as an example.  Of course,
> ford.com is a registered domain. It would be better to follow the IESG
> statement on examples (the URL is above).

Changed it to customerservice@example.org

> Section 7 uses Poker Galaxy  as an example.  Of course, this is a real
> web site. It would be better to follow the IESG statement on examples
> (the URL is above).  It seems best to use the same names here as are
> used in Section 7.2.

I changed to “a poker site” to match that phrase, which is used in the 1st para of that section.

> Nits:
> 
> Section 1 includes: "... SDP-based like SIP."  Please add a reference
> for SDP.

I have to admit that I’d probably be confused if there was a reference to SDP after "SDP-based like SIP [RFC4566]” and it reads a little awkward if we do "SDP-based [RFC4566[ like SIP.  RFC 4566 is referred to in s3 when the SDP attribute is defined and there’s a reference tor SIP, which also refers to SDP,  earlier.  I tend think the reader won’t be that confused ;)

> Section 4.1: s/ permissions till later/ permissions until later/

Fixed

> Section 4.4: please add a reference for STUN.

The reference is a sentence later.

> Section 6.2: s/(though see Section 6.3/(See Section 6.3/

fixed

> Section 6.4: please do not enclose the note is '[' and ']'.  Avoid
> confusion with reference syntax.  One solution is to put the note at
> the end of the paragraph.

fixed (I just remove the [ ]).

> Section 6.4: s/non-turn candidates/non-TURN candidates/

fixed

> Section 6.5: the phrase "Implementations MUST implement" seems awkward.
> Perhaps "Implementations MUST support".  This appears several places.

fixed

> Section 6.5 ought to begin with "All data channels MUST be secured via
> DTLS."  This appears half way through the section, but the material that
> comes before is really in support of this sentence.

Eh - when I read that I thought - generic requirements and then ones for media and the data channels.

> Section 8.1 discusses "<user>@<domain>", but the discussion of "user"
> (note the quotes) and the discussion of domain (note the absense of
> quotes) are using different conventions.  Please use quotes in both
> places or neither place.

I think I fixed this.

> There are places in this document where "settings" is confusing.  It is
> unclear whether the word is referring to configuration settings or it
> is referring to an environment or situation.  Please look at each use
> of this word and consider alternatives.

I’ll leave this for ekr.