Re: [Gen-art] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-httpbis-origin-frame-04

Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com> Mon, 27 November 2017 02:05 UTC

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To: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
References: <151166787103.16046.10259096251205147245@ietfa.amsl.com> <E3172984-2411-4AB0-B53D-8DC4800B51AA@mnot.net>
From: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
Organization: University of Auckland
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Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2017 15:05:01 +1300
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-httpbis-origin-frame-04
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Hi Mark,

On 27/11/2017 12:38, Mark Nottingham wrote:
> Hi Brian,
> 
> Thanks for the review. Responses below.
> 
>> On 26 Nov 2017, at 2:44 pm, Brian Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com> wrote:
> [...]
>> Minor Issues:
>> -------------
>>
>>> 2.1.  Syntax
>> ...
>>> Origin: An OPTIONAL sequence of characters ... that the
>>> sender believes this connection is or could be authoritative for.
>>
>> So, that implies that all data in the ORIGIN frame might be false.
>> Doesn't that deserve a bit of a health warning at the beginning of the
>> Security Considerations?
> 
> The first paragraph of SC is already:
> 
> """
>    Clients that blindly trust the ORIGIN frame's contents will be
>    vulnerable to a large number of attacks.  See Section 2.4 for mitigations.
> """
> 
> What would you suggest?
> 
>> Also, using the word "believes" of a server
>> is strange. How would the server acquire uncertain knowledge in the
>> first place, and what algorithm would decide what it "believes"?
> 
> This is to emphasise that ORIGIN is advisory only -- it does not constitute proof (crypto does that).

Right. But I think it's the anthropomorphic choice of word that triggered me. If you said "that the sender asserts this connection is or could be authoritative for" I think I'd have nothing further to say, since it's clearly an assertion that needs to be checked.
 
> 
>> Appendix A doesn't show any sign of a client checking whether an
>> Origin-Entry is real.
> 
> As per Section 2.4, it isn't checked when the origin set is created or updated; it's checked when the value is used.

OK

> 
> 
>>> 2.3.  The Origin Set
>> ...
>>>  o  Host: the value sent in Server Name Indication (SNI, [RFC6066]
>>>     Section 3), converted to lower case
>>
>> In that reference:
>>
>>>> Literal IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are not permitted in "HostName".
>>
>> Is that an intended or unintended restriction for the ORIGIN frame?
>> In any case it should probably be mentioned explicitly to avoid confusion.
>> (If IPv6 literals were allowed, they might be very convenient for server
>> load balancing. But RFC6066 excludes that.)
> 
> Good catch. I don't think there's cause for confusion here (the text there isn't about what can go on the wire), but there is a corner case we haven't covered (when a client that supports SNI omits it because it's an IP literal). 
> 
> My inclination there is to say that the host is the SNI value or the server IP if SNI is missing; what do people think?

>From this reviewer's peanut gallery seat, that makes sense.

   Brian

> 
> Cheers,
> 
> --
> Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/
> 
>