Re: [HOKEY] AD review of draft-ietf-hokey-erp-aak

[Qin Wu <[e-mail]>]

Hi,Sujing:
Sorry for late reply.
I think you ask a very good question.
In the figure 3 of this draft,  ERP/AAK uses key hierarchy to generate
pRK, pRK further derive one new Integrity key pIK. The purpose of pIK
is to integrity protect ERP/AAK message.
And you propose to reuse rIK  to protect ERP/AAK message, since 
ERP/AAK message is still a ERP message. The only change to ERP is 
i)add some a few TLV/TV extensions to support ERP/AAK, e.g., pMSK lifetime, pRK lifetime, 
CAP Identifier.
ii) add flag bit in the ERP message to indicate this is for ERP/AAK usage.
I think this proposal makes a good use of existing key materials and  looks reasonable .
but I am not sure if using rIK cause some confliction or have potential impact to original ERP usage.
We will think about it. Thanks for your valuable comments.

Regards!
-Qin
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: [e-mail] 
  To: Qin Wu 
  Cc: Cao,Zhen ; Glen Zorn ; [e-mail] ; [e-mail] ; Stephen Farrell 
  Sent: Friday, December 02, 2011 2:46 PM
  Subject: ´ð¸´: Re: [HOKEY] AD review of draft-ietf-hokey-erp-aak



  Hi,Qin 


  > Hi, Stephen:
  > Thank for your valuable review. 
  > Here is my answer to the main issues I think and I skip most of 
  > editorial issues or nits issues.  
  > My coauthors will address the remaining issues.
  > ----------------------------------------
  > #7, p5 - "The rIK is used to protect this message." Is that right?
  > How is rIK used to protect the message when the message contain
  > rIK?  I also wondered what "protect" means exactly - are the flags
  > etc. all protected and how? 
  > 
  > [Qin] I think rIK should be corrected as pIK. pIK is used to protect
  > the ERP message
  > exchanged between the peer and the EA server. MSK used for normal 
  > EAP exchange should be further derived into
  > other child keys. Alternatively, the pMSK can be derived into child 
  > keys. These child keys protect the ERP 
  > message exchanged between the peer and SAP.

  I reviewed this darft, and IMO it may be OK to let rIK unchanged, 
  since your are encapsulating AAK in ERP (am I right?), and ERP msgs are integrity protected 
  by rIK. 
  If changed to pIK, then it will another matter. 

  I am not sure what exactly is in your  mind. 

  Regards! 

  -Sujing Zhou 



  > 
  > #8, p5 - If I'm an authenticated user and I send the message at
  > step 2 to the SAP, then can I get the SAP to forward the message to
  > anything on the Internet? If not, where does it say how that's
  > controlled? I guess the SAP knows based on its config and/or the
  > authentication state of the peer but if so you should probably say
  > that?
  > 
  > [Qin]: SAP plays the role of authenticator should encapsulate the ERP message
  > into AAA message and route the AAA message based on Realm part of KeyName-NAI.
  > 
  > #15, p8 - You can only have one keyName-NAI in the message and that
  > MAY have either the home domain name or the domain name to which
  > the peer is currently attached for ite realm part.  How does anyone
  > know which to include when? Seems underspecified or missing a
  > reference?
  > 
  > [Qin]: This was discussed on the list many times. Based on the discussion,
  > we take the following way:
  > The peer should know where to send the message? If the peer
  > communicate with the home server, the peer should carry home domain name
  > in the keyName-NAI. If the peer communicate with the local server, the peer
  > should carry local domain name in the keyName-NAI.
  > The authenticator or local ER server in the path can know if the 
  > KeyName-NAI carry 
  > local domain name by comparing the domain name carried in KeyName-
  > NAI with local 
  > domain name it has already known.
  > 
  > #16, p8 - How are CAP-Identifier and "Sequence number" TLVs
  > "associated"?
  > 
  > [Qin]: Suppose multiple CAP-identifiers are carried in the ERP message,
  > the same number of Sequence number TLVs should be carried with 
  > associated CAP-identifier.
  > We can rely on the order to associate each other.
  > 
  > #18, p8 - Exactly how is the sequence number used in the
  > calculation of the pMSK for each CAP? Can these be re-used? (Across
  > reboots?) Do they need to be random? That all needs stating I
  > think.
  > 
  > [Qin]: This was discussed on the list before. The results is:
  > If we carry three CAP-Identifiers, we should also send three 
  > Sequence number TLVs 
  > with associated CAP-Identifiers. The Sequence number for each CAP 
  > MUST not be reused.
  > 
  > #20, p8 - authentication tag - where is the input to the HMAC
  > function specified? (Its not here anyway.) I think someone needs to
  > say how this is calculated. That means both the plaintext (message)
  > input (e.g. are any header bits in/excluded?) and the key input
  > (which key?). It could be that this just needs a reference if its
  > done the same as some other RFC. An example would be great to give.
  > 
  > [Qin]: We should base on HMAC mechanims specified in RFC2104,
  > Use the integrity algorithm indicated in the Cryptosuite field to 
  > calculate authentication tag value. rIK will be used for calculation.
  > The message used to calculate authentication tag should exclude authentication
  > tag field and but not exclude header bits.
  > 
  > #22, p8 - You need references for the HMAC functions.
  > 
  > [Qin] It should be RFC2104.
  > 
  > #23, p8 - Should/are the choices for cryptosuites in some IANA
  > registry?  If not, why not? If so, where?
  > 
  > [Qin] RFC5296 has already created registries for'Re-authentication
  >    Cryptosuites'. These crytosuites can be reused for ERP-AAK.
  > 
  > #36, p11 - Is it ok for "different sequence numbers" to mean "just
  > increment" or not?  Is it ok for sequence numbers to be re-used say
  > after the peer reboots?  I think you need to say. 
  > 
  > [Qin] See the above answer to #16, #18.
  > 
  > 
  > Regards!
  > -Qin
  > ----- Original Message ----- 
  > From: "Stephen Farrell" <[e-mail]>
  > To: <[e-mail]>
  > Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2011 2:39 AM
  > Subject: [HOKEY] AD review of draft-ietf-hokey-erp-aak
  > 
  > 
  > > 
  > > Hi all,
  > > 
  > > Here's my review of this. There are a lot of comments,
  > > but quite a few are very nitty or are things where I
  > > probably just need to be told that I don't know enough
  > > about ERP. (Which is true of course:-)
  > > 
  > > Some are non trivial however, and there are a lot of nits,
  > > so I've put this into the revised-ID-needed state.
  > > 
  > > Probably best is to handle any easy ones via email and
  > > then setup a skype chat for whatever's left. Let me
  > > know...
  > > 
  > > Cheers,
  > > S.
  > > 
  > >
  > 
  > 
  > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  > 
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