Re: [ippm] Kathleen Moriarty's No Objection on draft-ietf-ippm-2679-bis-04: (with COMMENT)

["MORTON, ALFRED C (AL)" <[e-mail]>]

Something went wrong in cut/paste, so here's the text I propose:

Collecting measurements or using measurement results for reconnaissance 
to assist in subsequent system attacks is quite common.  Access to 
measurement results, or control of the  measurement systems to perform 
reconnaissance should be guarded against. 
See Section 7 of <xref target="I-D.ietf-lmap-framework"
(security considerations of the LMAP Framework) for system requirements 
that help to avoid measurement system compromise.


> -----Original Message-----
> From: MORTON, ALFRED C (AL)
> Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2015 8:45 AM
> To: 'Kathleen Moriarty'; The IESG
> Cc: Bill Cerveny; [e-mail]; draft-ietf-ippm-2679-
> [e-mail]; [e-mail]
> Subject: RE: Kathleen Moriarty's No Objection on draft-ietf-ippm-2679-
> bis-04: (with COMMENT)
> 
> Hi Kathleen,
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Kathleen Moriarty [mailto:[e-mail]]
> > Sent: Wednesday, August 19, 2015 6:27 PM
> > To: The IESG
> > Cc: Bill Cerveny; [e-mail]; draft-ietf-ippm-2679-
> > [e-mail]; [e-mail]
> > Subject: Kathleen Moriarty's No Objection on draft-ietf-ippm-2679-bis-
> > 04: (with COMMENT)
> >
> > Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for
> > draft-ietf-ippm-2679-bis-04: No Objection
> >
> ...
> > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ippm-2679-bis/
> >
> >
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > COMMENT:
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > I support Alissa's discuss.
> >
> > Alissa's comment reads as being more focused on privacy considerations
> > and this point should be expanded to consider operational security
> > considerations that have been around for a long time, but were not in
> > the original text of this RFC.  Collecting measurement data or using
> > measurement data for reconnaissance to later attack systems is quite
> > common.  Access to this data or the ability to use measurement
> > techniques to do reconnaissance activity should be guarded agist or at
> > least noted as a security consideration.  When you look at text to
> > address her comment, please expand it to include this operational
> > security consideration as it is a very real and present threat.  This
> > is pretty much the same as my discuss on the other IPPM draft.
> >
> 
> [ACM]
> There are some useful ideas here that can go into a note (for both
> drafts).
> Something like:
> 
> ---
> Collecting measurements or using measurement results for reconnaissance
> to assist in subsequent system attacks is quite common.  Access to
> measurement results, or control of the  to use measurement systems to do
> perform reconnaissance should be guarded against.
> See Section 7 of <xref target="I-D.ietf-lmap-framework"
> (security considerations for the LMAP Framework) for system requirements
> that help to avoid measurement system compromise.
> ---
> 
> Because we're guarding against access, we have a real recommendation we
> can make and a lot of prior study to draw upon.
> I don't think we need another memo for this aspect, the LMAP Security
> considerations cover system access security very well.
> 
> 
> I was struggling with the case where the attacker builds their own
> measurement system, measures metrics, and uses the results (so far,
> that's exactly what I do everyday), to assist a later attack.
> There doesn't seem to be anything productive we can say about attacker's
> purpose-built systems, and I doubt there's any value for attackers to
> say that their measurement system conforms to RFC 2679 bis.
> 
> Let me know if you have suggestions on the text above, Al
> 
>