Re: [IPsec] Clarification on identities involved in IKEv2EAPauthentication

"Amjad Inamdar (amjads)" <amjads@cisco.com> Fri, 13 November 2009 07:00 UTC

Return-Path: <amjads@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: ipsec@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ipsec@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5221C3A681F for <ipsec@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 12 Nov 2009 23:00:17 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -5.899
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.899 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.500, BAYES_00=-2.599, J_CHICKENPOX_63=0.6, J_CHICKENPOX_82=0.6, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id wOUHvwBb0zND for <ipsec@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 12 Nov 2009 23:00:16 -0800 (PST)
Received: from sj-iport-6.cisco.com (sj-iport-6.cisco.com [171.71.176.117]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2A2CE3A67BD for <ipsec@ietf.org>; Thu, 12 Nov 2009 23:00:16 -0800 (PST)
Authentication-Results: sj-iport-6.cisco.com; dkim=neutral (message not signed) header.i=none
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: ApoEAPuS/EqrR7H+/2dsb2JhbAC9GJgjgjeCBQSBbX4
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.44,735,1249257600"; d="scan'208";a="431600374"
Received: from sj-core-2.cisco.com ([171.71.177.254]) by sj-iport-6.cisco.com with ESMTP; 13 Nov 2009 07:00:46 +0000
Received: from xbh-bgl-412.cisco.com (xbh-bgl-412.cisco.com [72.163.129.202]) by sj-core-2.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.14.3) with ESMTP id nAD70gl5010624; Fri, 13 Nov 2009 07:00:45 GMT
Received: from xmb-bgl-417.cisco.com ([72.163.129.213]) by xbh-bgl-412.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Fri, 13 Nov 2009 12:30:43 +0530
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2009 12:30:40 +0530
Message-ID: <1CFAB1B15A6C1142BD1FC07D1CA82AB2016E687F@XMB-BGL-417.cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <2E13B90533934A499FD727F9B353613C51563E@zin33exm29.fsl.freescale.net>
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
Thread-Topic: [IPsec] Clarification on identities involved in IKEv2EAPauthentication
Thread-Index: AcpjJy+IbwOddBiQS5iIcvnXvUEoawAElh4gAAlcq7AADktBsAAlbamg
References: <1CFAB1B15A6C1142BD1FC07D1CA82AB2015F102B@XMB-BGL-417.cisco.com><4C814C81-70C3-4597-B279-FED18230331C@checkpoint.com><3A8C969225424C4D8E6BEE65ED8552DA4C446E@XMB-BGL-41C.cisco.com><39008D85-3D9B-4B8B-A9FA-C4C91658630E@checkpoint.com><3A8C969225424C4D8E6BEE65ED8552DA4C4472@XMB-BGL-41C.cisco.com><4A5E60B4-E903-441F-A839-09FE9198B468@checkpoint.com> <19195.18766.767555.230392@fireball.kivinen.iki.fi> <2E13B90533934A499FD727F9B353613C5155A7@zin33exm29.fsl.freescale.net> <1CFAB1B15A6C1142BD1FC07D1CA82AB2016E66F5@XMB-BGL-417.cisco.com> <2E13B90533934A499FD727F9B353613C51563E@zin33exm29.fsl.freescale.net>
From: "Amjad Inamdar (amjads)" <amjads@cisco.com>
To: Murthy N Srinivas-B22237 <B22237@freescale.com>, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 13 Nov 2009 07:00:43.0321 (UTC) FILETIME=[04615A90:01CA642F]
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Clarification on identities involved in IKEv2EAPauthentication
X-BeenThere: ipsec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion of IPsec protocols <ipsec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec>, <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipsec>
List-Post: <mailto:ipsec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec>, <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2009 07:00:17 -0000

Hi Murthy,

IKEv2 gatway even when acting as a pass-through would need the
authenticated EAP identity for local policy decisions. For instance,
gateway can group remote users based on the authenticated EAP-id (e.g.
based on the domain/realm part of the ID). Further, with PSK and PKI
auth methods, it is the authenticated ID that is used for policy
decisions and that should be same even with EAP auth.

Thanks,
-Amjad 

-----Original Message-----
From: Murthy N Srinivas-B22237 [mailto:B22237@freescale.com] 
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2009 6:35 PM
To: Amjad Inamdar (amjads); Tero Kivinen; Yoav Nir
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [IPsec] Clarification on identities involved in
IKEv2EAPauthentication


Amjad,

If the Authenticator includes the AAA server implementation,it should no
the EAP identity to enforce policies.If AAA server is separate,we can
add an attribute to AAA server for this purpose and in which case
Authenticator does not have to know the EAP identity.It will use the
attribute to select the policies.

Thanks
-ns murthy 

-----Original Message-----
From: Amjad Inamdar (amjads) [mailto:amjads@cisco.com]
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2009 4:09 PM
To: Murthy N Srinivas-B22237; Tero Kivinen; Yoav Nir
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [IPsec] Clarification on identities involved in
IKEv2EAPauthentication

Hi Murthy,

As per the RFC, with EAP authentication, policy lookups and access
control decisions should be based on EAP identity, so the gatway needs
to know the EAP identity.

The source of EAP identity for gateway is either IDi (when IDi is same
as EAP identity) or AAA server providing authenticated EAP identity
neither of which is mandated by RFC, and in case client(via IDi) and AAA
server do not provide EAP identity, the only way gateway can get EAP
identity is via EAP identity request to the client.

----- Ikev2-bis-05 section 2.16, last paragraph -----
   When the initiator authentication uses EAP, it is possible that the
   contents of the IDi payload is used only for AAA routing purposes and
   selecting which EAP method to use.  This value may be different from
   the identity authenticated by the EAP method.  It is important that
   policy lookups and access control decisions use the actual
   authenticated identity.  Often the EAP server is implemented in a
   separate AAA server that communicates with the IKEv2 responder.  In
   this case, the authenticated identity has to be sent from the AAA
   server to the IKEv2 responder.
----------------------------------------------------------

Thanks,
-Amjad



-----Original Message-----
From: Murthy N Srinivas-B22237 [mailto:B22237@freescale.com]
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2009 7:30 AM
To: Tero Kivinen; Yoav Nir
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; Amjad Inamdar (amjads)
Subject: RE: [IPsec] Clarification on identities involved in
IKEv2EAPauthentication


 Policy lookups are selected by Authenticator based on Authorization
information received from AAA server after successful Authentication.
The AAA sever uses an attribute(radius) to send a reference to the
Authorization information specific for the specific client.The
Authenticator need not know the EAP identitity of the client, if it is
different from IKE identity.  

The Authenticator requires to know the EAP identity only if it
implements the AAA server functionality.
 
ns murthy

-----Original Message-----
From: ipsec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
Of Tero Kivinen
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2009 5:01 AM
To: Yoav Nir
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; Amjad Inamdar (amjads)
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Clarification on identities involved in
IKEv2EAPauthentication

Yoav Nir writes:
> Since the gateway acts as a pass-through, the requirement here is more

> for the client, which is typically more integrated. The client should 
> be prepared to give an identity hint both in IKE and later in the EAP 
> session.

And in that case the identities should really be same, and if they
differ then the authenticated identity needs to be used for policy
lookups, meaning that the EAP identity needs to be used. So the gateway
needs to get that authenticated identity from the AAA server so it can
do policy lookups based on it. 
--
kivinen@iki.fi
_______________________________________________
IPsec mailing list
IPsec@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec