Re: [IPsec] Working group last call for the draft-nir-ipsecme-eddsa-00
Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com> Sun, 12 March 2017 23:53 UTC
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From: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>
Date: Sun, 12 Mar 2017 19:53:13 -0400
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To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Cc: "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>, David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com>, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Working group last call for the draft-nir-ipsecme-eddsa-00
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Hi, This looks good to me. Here is the text to justify the downref ;-) The Downref is justified by RFC3967 as it falls into the following case: o A standards track document may need to refer to a protocol or algorithm developed by an external body but modified, adapted, or profiled by an IETF informational RFC. Yours, Daniel On Sun, Mar 12, 2017 at 2:14 PM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi, Daniel. > > See my comments inline. > > Also see this pull request: https://github.com/ietf- > ipsecme/drafts/pull/25 > > Unless I hear some push-back, I will submit this right before the deadline. > > Yoav > > On 8 Mar 2017, at 20:49, Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com> > wrote: > > Hi, > > Please find my comments regarding the draft. I believe the draft is ready > to be moved forward. I do not have strong opinion on the value to assign. > > Yours, > > Daniel > > The Internet Key Exchange protocol [RFC7296] can use arbitrary > signature algorithms as described in [RFC7427]. The latter RFC > defines the SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS notification where each side of > the IKE negotiation lists its supported hash algorithms. This > assumes that all signature schemes involve a hashing phase followed > by a signature phase. This made sense because most signature > algorithms either cannot sign messages bigger than their key or > truncate messages bigger than their key. > > EdDSA ([I.D-eddsa]) defines signature methods that do not require > pre-hashing of the message. Unlike other methods, these accept > arbitrary-sized messages, so no pre-hashing is required. These > methods are called Ed25519 and Ed448, which respectively use the > Edwards 25519 and the Edwards 448 ("Goldilocks") curves. Although > that document also defines pre-hashed versions of these algorithm, > those versions are not recommended for protocols where the entire to- > be-signed message is available at once. > > MGLT: I think that a pointer for the recommendation should be provided - > section 10.5 of I.D-eddsa. > > > Added. Except that now it’s in section 8.5 of RFC 8032. > > The first sentence of the paragraph above confuses me. Although this si > true, I prefer to say that EdDSA ([I.D-eddsa]) defines signatures methods > that includes pre-hasing as well as signature methods that do not require > prehashing. > > > Yes, but the first paragraph is all about the assumption that all > signature methods have a pre-hash stage. The new thing about EdDSA is that > it introduces a method that does not have a pre-hash stage. The fact that > we are not even specifying the use of EdDSA with pre-hash is all the more > reason to push the mention of this to the end of the paragraph. > > How about: > > EdDSA ([RFC8032]) defines signature methods that do not require pre- > hashing of the message. Unlike other methods, these accept > arbitrary-sized messages, so no pre-hashing is required. These > methods are called Ed25519 and Ed448, which respectively use the > Edwards 25519 and the Edwards 448 ("Goldilocks") curves. Although > that document also defines pre-hashed versions of these algorithm, > those versions are not recommended for protocols where the entire to- > be-signed message is available at once. See section 8.5 or RFC 8032 > for that recommendation. > > > EdDSA defines the binary format of the signatures that should be used > in the "Signature Value" field of the Authentication Data Format in > section 3. The CURDLE PKIX document ([I.D-curdle-pkix]) defines the > object identifiers (OIDs) for these signature methods. For > convenience, these OIDs are repeated in Appendix A. > > MGLT: Note that the pkix document is still on discussion. -- Although IOD > seems out of the scope of the discussion. > > > Since I’m referencing an I-D normatively, they become a cluster. If Curdle > decides to allocate other OIDs we’ll fix this specification as well. > > Not that any of us expect that to happen. > > Yoav > > BTW: RFC 8032 is Informational, while this document and RFC4492bis and the > Curdle I-D are standards track. So I guess the shepherd’s write-up should > reflect that RFC 8032 should be added to the downref registry. > > > > _______________________________________________ > IPsec mailing list > IPsec@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec > >
- [IPsec] Working group last call for the draft-nir… Tero Kivinen
- Re: [IPsec] Working group last call for the draft… David Schinazi
- Re: [IPsec] Working group last call for the draft… Tero Kivinen
- Re: [IPsec] Working group last call for the draft… Tommy Pauly
- Re: [IPsec] Working group last call for the draft… Paul Wouters
- Re: [IPsec] Working group last call for the draft… David Schinazi
- Re: [IPsec] Working group last call for the draft… Andreas Steffen
- Re: [IPsec] Working group last call for the draft… Tero Kivinen
- Re: [IPsec] Working group last call for the draft… Daniel Migault
- Re: [IPsec] Working group last call for the draft… Yoav Nir
- Re: [IPsec] Working group last call for the draft… David Schinazi
- Re: [IPsec] Working group last call for the draft… Yoav Nir
- Re: [IPsec] Working group last call for the draft… Daniel Migault