Re: [kitten] Permissible (and imp..) side-effects of GSS_Acquire_cred()

Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> Sat, 28 March 2015 20:43 UTC

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From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
To: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@secure-endpoints.com>
Date: Sat, 28 Mar 2015 16:43:55 -0400
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Permissible (and imp..) side-effects of GSS_Acquire_cred()
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On Sat, 2015-03-28 at 14:40 -0400, Jeffrey Altman wrote:
> On 3/19/2015 1:44 PM, Simo Sorce wrote:
> > On Thu, 2015-03-19 at 12:33 -0500, Nico Williams wrote:
> >> On Thu, Mar 19, 2015 at 01:04:46PM -0400, Simo Sorce wrote:
> >>> Would you consider an explicitly set KRB5CCNAME env variable as an
> >>> indication the admin is ok with acquired credentials ending up there ?
> >>> Ie a) but using KRB5CCNAME presence as an indication a ccache can be
> >>> used ?
> >>
> >> That helps, though there can still be non-determinism when the ccache
> >> does not exist yet.  (But if the admin/user set it, why wouldn't they
> >> also kinit -k to remove all doubt?)
> > 
> > Because, at least with the current implementation of the Keytab
> > initiation feature in MIT, if you kinit explicitly then
> > gss_init_sec_context will not take over and keep initiating when
> > credentials expires etc...
> > 
> > I understand this may be simply an implementation issue/bug and it can
> > be decided differently, but in general keytab initiation is used to
> > allow unattended systems work on their own, so the admin will start a
> > service with all the evn var set right and let it to it's own thing,
> > requiring to script a manual kinit would defeat the purpose.
> > 
> > So I am trying to see if you think a) is compatible with something
> > priming an empty initial ccache provided that both KRB5CCNAME and
> > KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME have been set in the environment (both required).
> > 
> > Simo.
> 
> Simo,
> 
> I would be more comfortable with an environment variable or krb5.conf
> option that explicitly states to perform X behavior.  The existence of
> environment variables that are useful on their own in combination should
> not should trigger an unexpected behavior.  Especially when those
> environment variables are interpreted different by different Kerberos
> distributions.
> 
> Just my two cents ...

I think KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME fits the description, its only use is to
indicate which credentials to use for keytab initiation. I think it fair
to assume that if an admin has explicitly set it that he wants to allow
keytab initiation.

Simo.

-- 
Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York