Re: [MIB-DOCTORS] Fix of Security Guidelines for IETF MIB Modules
Glenn Mansfield Keeni <glenn@cysols.com> Sun, 30 September 2018 13:00 UTC
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To: Randy Presuhn <randy_presuhn@alumni.stanford.edu>, mib-doctors@ietf.org, warren@kumari.net, ibagdona@gmail.com
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From: Glenn Mansfield Keeni <glenn@cysols.com>
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Date: Sun, 30 Sep 2018 21:59:05 +0900
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/mib-doctors/TUNMTlb1_AEaCuZMO8skndeir0k>
Subject: Re: [MIB-DOCTORS] Fix of Security Guidelines for IETF MIB Modules
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Hi, > What > is the point of limiting read access and then sending the > information in the clear? Total agreement. Sending info in the clear is by default NG and must be strongly discouraged. It will help to have some proposed replacement text for > OLD: It is thus important to control even GET and/or NOTIFY access to > these objects and possibly to even encrypt the values of these > objects when sending them over the network via SNMP. > Glenn On 2018/09/30 2:56, Randy Presuhn wrote: > Hi - > > On 9/28/2018 11:52 PM, Glenn Mansfield Keeni wrote: >> Warren,Ignas, >> Hi. The Security Guidelines for IETF MIB Modules >> needs a fix in the text that is generally used verbatim >> in MIB documents. >> The proposed fix is >> >> OLD: Some of the readable objects in this MIB module >> (i.e., objects with a MAX-ACCESS other than >> not-accessible) >> NEW: Some of the readable objects in this MIB module >> (e.g., objects with a MAX-ACCESS other than >> not-accessible) >> >> The above is a significant nit. It appears in the >> Security Considerations sections section of every >> MIB document. >> >> There has been some discussion on the IETF MIB-DOCTORS >> mailing list on this matter. There is no disagreement >> on the proposed fix. > > In the scope of the document under consideration at the > time, I think that fix was ok, but in the context of a > boilerplate update I think we'd need to do better. > > For those who missed the original discussion, the issue is > that the values of "not-accessible" objects can > (1) be sensitive > (2) be revealed as index values > > Consider, as a trivial, made-up example, a table indexed > by user name. > > OLD: Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (i.e., objects > with a MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered > sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. > > NEW: Some of the objects in this MIB module may be considered sensitive > or vulnerable in some network environments. This includes INDEX > objects with a MAX-ACCESS of not-accessible, and any indices from > other modules exposed via AUGMENTS. > > But, if we are going to touch the boilerplate, I wouldn't stop there. > I think the next sentence brings its own related problems. > > OLD: It is thus important to control even GET and/or NOTIFY access to > these objects and possibly to even encrypt the values of these > objects when sending them over the network via SNMP. > > The issues I see with this are: > > (1) in the case of objects used as indexes, controlling access to > them via VACM is *not* just a matter of controlling access to > the objects themselves, but of controlling access to all > objects using them as indexes, including usage via AUGMENTS. > > (2) index values may be leaked by "pointer" objects of type > OBJECT IDENTIFIER. If VACM is being used for access control, > the rules have to be formulated in terms of the pointer, not > the set of things it might point to. That problem is outside > the scope of the module whose objects are being pointed to, > but it's still a problem that needs to be addressed in any > module defining such pointers. > > (3) even without considering the case of indexes, I would argue that > if something is sensitive enough to merit limiting read access, > in any sane security regime it will also merit encryption. What > is the point of limiting read access and then sending the > information in the clear? > > I'll concede that there are cases where limiting *write* access does not > imply a need for encryption, but this paragraph conflates sensitive and > vulnerable information. It might make sense to split the paragraph into > two, one identifying the information for which disclosure is an issue, > and another identifying the information for which creation / deletion / > modification is an issue. > > Randy
- [MIB-DOCTORS] Fix of Security Guidelines for IETF… Glenn Mansfield Keeni
- Re: [MIB-DOCTORS] Fix of Security Guidelines for … Randy Presuhn
- Re: [MIB-DOCTORS] Fix of Security Guidelines for … Glenn Mansfield Keeni
- Re: [MIB-DOCTORS] Fix of Security Guidelines for … Randy Presuhn
- Re: [MIB-DOCTORS] Fix of Security Guidelines for … Warren Kumari
- Re: [MIB-DOCTORS] Fix of Security Guidelines for … Glenn Mansfield Keeni
- Re: [MIB-DOCTORS] Fix of Security Guidelines for … Glenn Mansfield Keeni
- Re: [MIB-DOCTORS] Fix of Security Guidelines for … Warren Kumari
- Re: [MIB-DOCTORS] Fix of Security Guidelines for … Glenn Mansfield Keeni
- Re: [MIB-DOCTORS] Fix of Security Guidelines for … Warren Kumari