Re: [Mud] Simplified Quarantine model

Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ca> Tue, 23 July 2019 23:07 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ca>
To: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>
cc: "M. Ranganathan" <mranga@gmail.com>, mud@ietf.org
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Comments: In-reply-to tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> message dated "Tue, 21 May 2019 12:33:12 +0530."
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Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2019 19:07:34 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Mud] Simplified Quarantine model
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tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> wrote:
    > How do you identify an attacker is using the victim device's MAC and IP
    > address to send attack traffic (e.g. SYN flood) ?

On wired, this has to be protected by using a managed switch and
then locking ports down to mac addresses.

On wireless, one needs unique PSKs (or Enterprise WPA), which then one can
identify which device is which, and lock the MAC address down.

Of course, all this fails if the devices are expected to randomize the L2
address.

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