Re: [nvo3] Geneve architecture and question around transit devices

Hi,

Thanks for the response. In my view group communication does not address
the threat model in the context of Geneve, more especially, I am not
sure that group communication considers that some piece of information
can be disclosed to a subset of the members of the group. That said, if
you believe that could be a way to address the threat model, I am more
than happy to hear from you. The mls WG may also have interesting
discussions related to group communications.

Instead, what I had in mind were all discussions/proposals/academic
publications around TLS and the coexistence of middle boxes. Discussions
includes but are not limited to an explicit signaling of the middle box,
the disclosed information to the middle box versus the information not
disclosed...

Yours,
Daniel
~

On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 12:07 PM Michael Kafka <m.kafka@aon.at> wrote:

> On 19/03/01/ 17:23, Daniel Migault wrote:
>
> > As mentioned earlier, this cannot be true and providing end-to-end
> > security between three or more party has not yet been solved at the
> > IETF.
>
> Just off the top of my head:
>
> OSPFv3, 7. Key Management, static keys,
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4552#page-5
> Static keys could be distributed in SDN environments through
> central controller. Requires mutual trust.
>
> Much older GSAKMP from the era of IKE/ISAKMP, still standards
> track, not obsoleted
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4535
>
> Rgds, MiKa
>
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