Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question regarding RFC 7592

[Justin Richer <[e-mail]>]

I think this is where we disagree about the nature of “resource”, as I would classify a management API as a resource. Specifically, the client’s own records at the AS.

The “IF” in your statement is a big if, and one that is uncommon even today. Also, I want to note that if the client can’t "manage an access token” very well, then it’s going to have a very hard time being an OAuth client once it’s done registering. In other words, the goal was to take a piece of universal functionality that all OAuth clients would be guaranteed to have.

I’ll agree that it’s a bit weird having an access token issued as part of a response, but the alternative was to invent a new flow to force a client to go through another round trip to the token endpoint to get its management token. If you’re already directly giving the client a temporary credential that it can use at the AS, then just give the client the final token to do the job directly instead. At least, that was the thinking, and I still agree with that line of thought today even with its quirks.

— Justin

On Sep 17, 2019, at 12:40 AM, Dick Hardt <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:

The registration supports the client having a jwks, so if the client provides jwks, then using them to sign an authentication request seems easier than trying to manage an access token.

The token endpoint is an API as well. We would agree that it is not a resource, but a management API. Similarly, I see the client's management of its registration to not be a resource operation, but a management API.
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On Mon, Sep 16, 2019 at 7:36 PM Justin Richer <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
I don’t see a reason to use an assertion here. JWT authentication would require at least a secret if not a key of some type for authentication for all clients, and it was determined that dynamic registration shouldn’t require the clients (even public clients) to support things they weren’t already capable of doing. Besides, the management endpoint isn’t a token endpoint (though I’m curious to hear why you’d say that) — it’s an API you can call to manage a client’s registration data over time. Sounds like an RS, if you ask me.

— Justin

On Sep 15, 2019, at 1:05 AM, Dick Hardt <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:

Curious why the client management API uses bearer tokens rather than JWTs per RFC 7523 for the client to authenticate. The client management API seems more similar to a token endpoint than a resource.
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On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 12:08 PM Justin Richer <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
Travis has this correct — the “registration access token” is passed to the client for the express purpose of accessing the client management API, and is not the same as, or entangled with, any access tokens that the client requests through the OAuth process after the registration has occurred. The reasons for this separation are many, but at the core it comes down to the client always acting on its own behalf when it does registration, and acting on behalf of some other party (usually a user) when it’s doing OAuth. Additionally, registration management is a function of the AS, whereas the protected APIs are a function of the RS — note this is a logical separation and there’s nothing stopping AS and RS functions from being deployed in any number of patterns.

A few common questions we got asked when writing this functionality into the spec:

Why use an access token at all? Because it’s a credential for a specific API issued by the AS and handed to the client in a programmatic manner. This is exactly what OAuth tokens were made for.

Why not use the client’s credentials? Because not all clients are set up to have credentials, plus we’d be spreading the requirement to support different kinds of client credentials to another endpoint.

Why not issue an authorization code? Because then the client would need to make yet another round trip, and not all clients are authorization-code-grant clients to begin with.

Why not make a new grant type? Because then the client would need to make yet another round trip, and we’d have to invent a whole new grant type with a new temporary credential when we could just use that temporary credential directly instead.

— Justin

On Sep 13, 2019, at 8:23 AM, Robache Hervé <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:

Thanks Travis

I understand that, once the client has retrieved its [client_id] through RFC7591 initial registration, it is then able to ask for an access token that will be used for accessing the RFC7592 entry-points. Am I right?

Best regards

Hervé

De : Travis Spencer [mailto:[e-mail]]
Envoyé : ven. 13 13:30
À : Robache Hervé
Cc : [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>
Objet : Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question regarding RFC 7592

No. The initial access token is issued by the AS when registration is protected (appendix 1.2 in RFC 7591). As stated in section 1.2, the method and means by which this is obtained can vary. The registration access token in RFC 7592 is used to protect the registration management API and allow updates to the client after it is registered. You might have one (the registration access token) but not the other (initial access token) when open registration is allowed (appendix 1.1 in RFC 7591).

HTH!

On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 7:37 AM Robache Hervé <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
Hi

RFC 7592 introduces a « Registration Access Token ». Are this token and the way to get it similar to what is specified as “Initial Access Token” in RFC 7591/Appendix A ?

If so, can the Open Dynamic Client Registration (RFC7591/A.1.1) be extrapolated to RFC7592 as the same way?

Thanks in advance for your clarification.

Hervé ROBACHE
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