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Re: [openpgp] 1PA3PC: first-party attested third-party certifications (making Key Server Prefs no-modify actionable)

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Sat, 31 August 2019 06:04 UTC

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Date: Sat, 31 Aug 2019 01:04:19 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Cc: openpgp@ietf.org, Heiko Stamer <HeikoStamer@gmx.net>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] 1PA3PC: first-party attested third-party certifications (making Key Server Prefs no-modify actionable)
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On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 01:31:42AM -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> 
> This new proposal (diff for RFC 4880bis attached) claims subpacket
> codepoint 37 for shipping these attestations.  I've also put this
> proposal as a merge request here:
> https://gitlab.com/openpgp-wg/rfc4880bis/merge_requests/20

It looks like this is in an "IETF Review" registry; please please please
consider making a request for an RFC 7120 early allocation.
I know the risk is probably less of conflicting codepoint squatting in
openpgp than in TLS, but in TLS we managed to have *three* different
extensions squatting on the same codepoint, and it is pretty unpleasant to
resolve.

-Ben

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