Re: [Perc] I-D Action: draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet-09.txt

Thanks!

I am in the process of reviewing the framework draft. I notice it has some normative language may conflict with this draft concerning rekeying. From our previous discussion:

> 
> - Next Sentence: "Outbound packets SHOULD continue to use the old SRTP Master Key for 250 ms after” Does that imply a normative requirement for recipients to keep old keys around for at least that long? There’s currently an implementation suggestion about that, but it doesn’t use MUST or SHOULD.
> (Editorial: The sentence seems to belong in the “outbound” section, not the “inbound” section.)
> 
> Yeah, moved this to the outbound section.  Added MAY-level inbound considerations to the implementation notes -- either the receiver can accept packet loss or do trial decryption.

If I am reading correctly, the framework (§4.5.2)  says senders MUST delay before sending media with the new key. Is that a conflict? If so, which is correct? Also, the framework does not specify the length of the delay.

Does it make sense for this to be specified in both places?

Ben.

> On Oct 17, 2018, at 4:37 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
> 
> Ben: With this revision, and the one of -double just posted, I think these two are ready for LC.
> 
> On Wed, Oct 17, 2018, 17:34 <internet-drafts@ietf.org <mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org>> wrote:
> 
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Privacy Enhanced RTP Conferencing  WG of the IETF.
> 
>         Title           : Encrypted Key Transport for DTLS and Secure RTP
>         Authors         : Cullen Jennings
>                           John Mattsson
>                           David A. McGrew
>                           Dan Wing
>                           Flemming Andreason
>         Filename        : draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet-09.txt
>         Pages           : 24
>         Date            : 2018-10-17
> 
> Abstract:
>    Encrypted Key Transport (EKT) is an extension to DTLS (Datagram
>    Transport Layer Security) and Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
>    (SRTP) that provides for the secure transport of SRTP master keys,
>    rollover counters, and other information within SRTP.  This facility
>    enables SRTP for decentralized conferences by distributing a common
>    key to all of the conference endpoints.
> 
> 
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet/ <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet/>
> 
> There are also htmlized versions available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet-09 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet-09>
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet-09 <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet-09>
> 
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet-09 <https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet-09>
> 
> 
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org <http://tools.ietf.org/>.
> 
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/ <ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/>
> 
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Re: [Perc] I-D Action: draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet-09.txt

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