[pkix] [Errata Rejected] RFC6844 (4922)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Fri, 03 February 2017 15:50 UTC

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Subject: [pkix] [Errata Rejected] RFC6844 (4922)
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The following errata report has been rejected for RFC6844,
"DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=6844&eid=4922

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Status: Rejected
Type: Technical

Reported by: Attila Bruncsák <Attila.Bruncsak@itu.int>
Date Reported: 2017-02-03
Rejected by: Stephen Farrell (IESG)

Section: 4

Original Text
-------------
The search for a CAA record climbs the DNS name tree from the
   specified label up to but not including the DNS root '.'.

Corrected Text
--------------
The search for a CAA record must not climb the DNS name tree from the
   specified label up.

Notes
-----
Obviously it does not make any sense to climb up. If there would be CAA record published for the "com" TLD, than it would make what relation to the CAA of the "example.com" domain? From an other viewpoint: all CAs are going to check the "com" TLD for CAA record if a given organization has no CAA record published in its own domain?
Another, more practical example: "example.com" needs a certificate for his top domain (https://example.com/), so it decides to publish the CAA record to enforce the security. Doing this it may unknowingly affect the renewal of the certificate for the wellhidden.hr.example.com where the hr.example.com domain is under different administrative authority than example.com domain itself.
 --VERIFIER NOTES-- 
   This would be a change and hence is not an erratum

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RFC6844 (draft-ietf-pkix-caa-15)
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Title               : DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record
Publication Date    : January 2013
Author(s)           : P. Hallam-Baker, R. Stradling
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG