Re: Increasing QUIC connection ID size

[Jana Iyengar <[e-mail]>]

Just thinking aloud about key rotation -- you could always use the
high-order bit as an expicit key selection bit... the server and load
balancer can then use this bit during rotation to change keys without
breakages.

On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 5:05 PM, Roberto Peon <[e-mail]> wrote:

> Correct/agreed. The L4 ‘router’ must be able to decrypt/interpret the data
> in order to act upon it. This requires sharing of some key material.
>
> -=R
>
>
>
> *From: *QUIC <[e-mail]> on behalf of "Lubashev, Igor" <
> [e-mail]>
> *Date: *Thursday, January 11, 2018 at 4:55 PM
> *To: *Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <[e-mail]>, Victor Vasiliev <
> [e-mail]>, IETF QUIC WG <[e-mail]>
>
> *Subject: *RE: Increasing QUIC connection ID size
>
>
>
> I think the idea is that the key used to encrypt connection ID is known to
> both the server and the router.  That key would need to be rotated
> periodically, and the router would need to understand which key was used
> for this particular connection, but that can be solved.
>
>
>
> *From:* Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen [mailto:[e-mail]]
> *Sent:* Thursday, January 11, 2018 7:25 PM
> *To:* Lubashev, Igor <[e-mail]>; Victor Vasiliev <
> [e-mail]>; IETF QUIC WG <[e-mail]>
> *Subject:* RE: Increasing QUIC connection ID size
>
>
>
> Actually, on encryption of connection ID, this is not so simple.
>
>
>
> We must assume there is only a single key for many connections because the
> router is not part of a key exchange. This unique value or counter used for
> encrypting a single block cannot be the same for two different connections
> ID’s, but it can be public. This means that it must be stored in the packet
> header. And, as it turns out, random connection ID chosen by a trusted
> source, can be used for such a unique value. But then it must be used to
> encrypt and/or authenticate something else carrying the actual routing
> information. So now you start to really need some extra payload.
>
>
>
> Alternatively the routing information is entirely random such as content
> hashed routing. Then you only need to authenticate the routing data. You
> can do that with a HMAC, and CMAC could probably also work. The additional
> benefit is that you can probably get away with 64-bits for all routing
> information possibly including the auth tag. Say 48 bits of routing data
> and 16 bits of auth tag.
>
>
>
> Kind Regards,
>
> Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
>
>
>
> On 12 January 2018 at 00.57.21, Lubashev, Igor ([e-mail])
> wrote:
>
> I am interested in exploring this proposal, since it allows for more
> flexible schemes of encoding routing metadata and a checksum.  I would also
> like to be explicit about the connection ID size in a packet header,
> though, since it greatly simplifies the implementation.
>
>
>
>    - Igor
>
> *From:* Victor Vasiliev [mailto:[e-mail]]
> *Sent:* Thursday, January 11, 2018 6:16 PM
> *To:* IETF QUIC WG <[e-mail]>
> *Subject:* Increasing QUIC connection ID size
>
>
>
> Hi everyone,
>
>
>
> In the current version of QUIC, the connection ID size is fixed to be a
> 64-bit opaque blob, and that is set as an invariant in the protocol.
>
>
>
> I’ve looked into possibility of using a connection ID to encode the
> specific server details into it (to provide stability of the connection in
> case of load balancing changes, especially BGP flaps for anycast IPs), and
> have chatted about this with other people I knew were interested in this.
> It seems like 64 bits might be too small for this purpose, and we might
> want to leave an opportunity to extend the connection ID size.
>
>
>
> The basic idea is that you want to be able to:
>
>    1. Store some routing metadata in the connection ID.
>    2. Have some entropy that allows distinguish users with identical
>    routing metadata.
>    3. Have a checksum to ensure the validity of routing information
>    4. Encrypt the information above to prevent disclosing the route
>    information and allow generating uncorrelatable connection IDs.
>
> There are two underlying issues here.  The first problem is that all of
> this does not fit well into 64 bits, and you have to seriously compromise
> on the strength of the checksum (which is bad especially if you want it to
> be a MAC rather than a checksum).  The second problem is that encrypting
> 64-bit values fast is actually fairly hard since the block ciphers easily
> available in hardware have 128-bit block size, and the performance
> requirements on load balancers are tighter than on servers.
>
>
>
> In other words, having a 128-bit connection ID provides for an easy secure
> way to generate unlinkable connection IDs on migration.
>
>
>
> So, the problem we’re trying to solve is that the connection ID is too
> small.  There are two questions I believe the working group should answer
> at this point:
>
>    1. Do we want to address this problem at this point in standardization
>    process?
>    2. If we don’t address this problem right now, how do we structure the
>    standard in a way that we can extend the connection ID in the future?
>
> There are multiple ways to solve the problem of making connection ID
> larger.  One is to just add extra bit to the “omit connection ID” field to
> allow 128-bit connection IDs.  Another approach is to allow connection ID
> size to be explicitly specified by the server, and then assume that the
> load balancer knows that size and no one else on the path needs to read it.
>
>
>
> There’s also a question of how much of connection IDs do middleboxes
> (excluding load balancers and other boxes owned by the same entity as
> either client or server) need to know.  We could go for both “middleboxes
> should be always able to read the entire ID” and “middleboxes should not
> read connection IDs at all options”, but I think there’s also a room for
> more flexible formulations like “middleboxes always get first 64 bits and
> they have useful entropy to distinguish connections”.
>
>
>
>   -- Victor.
>
>