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Re: New drafts: draft-kuehlewind-quic-manageability-00 and draft-kuehlewind-quic-applicability-00

Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Thu, 23 March 2017 12:26 UTC

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Subject: Re: New drafts: draft-kuehlewind-quic-manageability-00 and draft-kuehlewind-quic-applicability-00
From: Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch>
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Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 13:26:30 +0100
Cc: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>, IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
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To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
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I think one thing we easily can say it that if you fall back to TCP, you MUST fallback to TLS over TCP.


> Am 22.03.2017 um 01:34 schrieb Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>:
> 
> On 22 March 2017 at 10:30, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net> wrote:
>> I am not sure that security expectations for DNS over QUIC should be
>> lower. I would expect DNS over QUIC to match the security of DNS over
>> TLS (RFC 7858).
> 
> I did assumed that that did not exist, which might be unfair.
> 
>> We need consider the "game theory" aspects of any downgrade. If we allow
>> fall back to a non encrypted alternative, then we reward the attackers.
>> They block QUIC, observe the protocol silently switching to clear text,
>> get access to the data that they are seeking, and all that without
>> causing too many customer complaints. On the other hand, if blocking
>> QUIC just blocks the service, customers will complain, to the service
>> providers of course, but also very quickly to the intermediaries that
>> set the block. For these blockers, the support cost will be much higher.
>> And that means they will be less likely to block random services.
> 
> An excellent point.  Though you are condoning a denial of service
> attack of a sort.  Not sure where I stand on the morality of that.
>

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