Re: [Rats] name of identity key

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Mon, 02 December 2019 20:15 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: "Smith, Ned" <ned.smith@intel.com>
cc: "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>, Guy Fedorkow <gfedorkow@juniper.net>, "pritikin@cisco.com" <pritikin@cisco.com>, Jessica Fitzgerald-McKay <jmfmckay@gmail.com>, Henk Berkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>, William Bellingrath <wbellingrath@juniper.net>
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Date: Mon, 02 Dec 2019 15:15:15 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Rats] name of identity key
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Smith, Ned <ned.smith@intel.com> wrote:
    nms> Maybe it makes sense to talk about how the keys are used rather than trying to name them?

    > Well, I think that having it named "the key we use for Onboarding" is the
    > same as saying, "Onboarding Key", right?

    nms> Right. I thought you were looking for names such as "IDevID". It
    nms> could be the IDevID is the onboarding key or that the attestation
    nms> key is the onboarding key. Somehow the onboarding protocol selects
    nms> which key is used if both are available.

Well, the issue I have, is that as an author of an onboarding protocol, there
is no "somehow", just confusion at this point.

I think that we really need to be a bit clearer here.

    > I don't know how the manufacturing process that involves a TPM with a TPM
    > attestation key works.  I just know that when doing BRSKI, that there were
    > issues with being confused between various TPM keys, and we originally wrote
    > text saying that the device Serial Number might be in weird places.  We later
    > ripped that text out, as time had changed things, and I'm worried that this
    > issue is not really dead.

    nms> There is still a possibility for a bootstrapping sequence post
    nms> factory shipment where "the onboarding key" doesn't yet
    nms> exist. Therefore, pre-onboarding is required to provision the
    nms> onboarding key. This may be what you describe as "the device Serial
    nms> Number might be in weird places".

yes, that's certainly an additional complication.

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