[saag] NSA bug in Windows 10

Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> Wed, 15 January 2020 14:59 UTC

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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2020 09:59:15 -0500
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Subject: [saag] NSA bug in Windows 10
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I have been reading the reports in the press.

>From what I gather, the attack allows an incompetent or malicious CA to
craft a malicious certificate. It may also be possible for a CSR to be
crafted that could result in a CA issuing a bad EE cert.

>From the limited information I can find, it would appear that we don't
actually have much of a problem as the whole WebPKI is predicated on the
idea that CAs are trusted and they have pretty much infinite ways to defect.

Has anyone checked the Certificate Transparency logs to see if any bogus
certs matching the NSA pattern are recorded? I would expect not as we
require specific NIST curves that have specific names.