Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-alakuijala-brotli-08

Tobias Gondrom <tobias.gondrom@gondrom.org> Thu, 14 April 2016 12:26 UTC

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Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2016 14:26:18 +0200
From: Tobias Gondrom <tobias.gondrom@gondrom.org>
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Subject: Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-alakuijala-brotli-08
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On 12/04/16 18:56, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On Tue 2016-04-12 12:16:13 -0400, Tobias Gondrom <tobias.gondrom@gondrom.org> wrote:
>> in my understanding this ID is _only_ about a compression, not about
>> encryption.  Therefore it is not even intended to be resistant to the
>> attack you describe below.  (for proper confidentiality the channel
>> would need to be encrypted.)
> Agreed, but encryption specs are often _only_ about encryption, even
> though they're sometimes layered over a compression protocol.
>
> I think your argument implies that this warning doesn't belong in either
> Security Considerations section (of the compression-less encryption
> protocol, or of the encryption-less compression protocol), which makes
> me sad.
>
> Instead, i think we should make people considering either protocol aware
> of the risks of the combination.  This doesn't have to be a huge edit,
> just a short paragraph in the security considerations.
>
>       --dkg

Just to be clear: This is just my own humble opinion, just one among 
many in the community. ;-)
It is up to the WG and editors to decide.

Cheers, Tobias