Re: [secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-unknown-msg-05

Chris Lonvick <clonvick@cisco.com> Wed, 05 March 2014 19:55 UTC

Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2014 11:54:54 -0800
From: Chris Lonvick <clonvick@cisco.com>
To: Qi Sun <sunqi@csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn>
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Cc: draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-unknown-msg.all@tools.ietf.org, iesg@ietf.org, secdir@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-unknown-msg-05
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Hi Qi,

That sounds reasonable.

Best regards,
Chris

On Wed, 5 Mar 2014, Qi Sun wrote:

> 
> 
> Dear Chris,
> 
> Many thanks for your comments! 
> 
> About the Security Considerations section, how about we add the following clarification:
> 
> OLD:
> 6.  Security Considerations
> 
>   As the relay agent will forward all unknown types of DHCPv6 messages,
>   a malicious attacker can interfere with the relaying function by
>   constructing fake DHCPv6 messages with arbitrary type code.  The same
>   problem may happen in current DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 practice where the
>   attacker constructs the fake DHCP message with a known type code.
>   ...
> 
> NEW:
> 6.  Security Considerations
> 
>   This document creates no new security issues that are not already
>   present in RFC3315.  By explicitly documenting the correct handling
>   of unknown messages, this document, if implemented, reduces any
>   security exposure that might result from incorrect handling of
>   unknown messages.  The following issues are issues that could already
>   be present with section 23 of [RFC3315], but we discuss them in
>   detail here as guidance for implementors.
> 
>   As the relay agent will forward all unknown types of DHCPv6 messages,
>   a malicious attacker can interfere with the relaying function by
>   constructing fake DHCPv6 messages with arbitrary type code.  The same
>   problem may happen in current DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 practice where the
>   attacker constructs the fake DHCP message with a known type code.
>   ...
> 
> Would that be OK? 
> 
> Best Regards,
> Qi
> //Sorry if you received duplicate mails.
> 
> 
> 
> On 2014-3-3, at 下午7:07, Chris Lonvick wrote:
> 
>
>       Hi,
>
>       I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments
>       were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last
>       call comments.
>
>       This document looks to be well thought out and almost complete.  I would like to see a statement in the Security Considerations section that this
>       specification adheres to the Security Considerations section of RFC 3315, and augments it by describing the disposition of unknown messages.
>
>       Other than that, the only very minor nit that I have is that the second and third paragraphs of the Security Considerations section are a single thought and
>       should be combined.
>
>       Thanks,
>       Chris
> 
> 
> 
>

[secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-u… Chris Lonvick
Re: [secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-dhc-dhcp… Qi Sun
Re: [secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-dhc-dhcp… Chris Lonvick