[secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-opsec-igp-crypto-requirements

Samuel Weiler <weiler@watson.org> Wed, 15 September 2010 18:13 UTC

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Date: Wed, 15 Sep 2010 14:13:53 -0400 (EDT)
From: Samuel Weiler <weiler@watson.org>
To: ietf@ietf.org, secdir@ietf.org, draft-ietf-opsec-igp-crypto-requirements.all@tools.ietf.org
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Subject: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-opsec-igp-crypto-requirements
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I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's 
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the 
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the 
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat 
these comments just like any other last call comments.

This is an informational document that appearently recaps requirement 
levels for implementation and use of crypto algorithms for hop-by-hop 
authentication of routing data.  Assuming that no requirements are 
being changed, I have no objections to the security considerations 
analysis, but I do have editorial comments.

I got lost as to the purpose of this doc.  Please reword the abstract 
and intro to make it clear that you're merely recapping requirements, 
not setting them (if that is indeed true).

Is there a way to present this information more compactly?  I suggest 
a table with routing protocol on one axis, crypto suite on another, 
and requirement status in the elements (perhaps with a cite to the doc 
that sets the requirement).  You might separely say "MANDATORY to 
implement, OPTIONAL to use, NOT SUGGESTED for use".

You could also put suggestions and speculation about the future in the 
same table, though you may need to define some terms.  And it needs to 
be clear when this doc diverges from past ones or makes a new 
statement.  I have not gone back through the previous docs to confirm 
that this doc isn't changing anything.

I see a whole bunch of lower case "may" and "should", and I'm 
wondering what to make of them.

In describing each routing protocol's authentication options, it would 
be helpful to say whether there's any in-band negotiation available. 
If so, more needs to be said about that in the security 
considerations.  If not, it should be documented here.

I don't need to hear three or four separate times that cleartext 
passwords are bad.

Minor: remove citations from the abstract (per rfc editor policy).

-- Sam