[secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis-19

Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> Tue, 27 February 2018 15:06 UTC

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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Subject: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis-19
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Reviewer: Sean Turner
Review result: Has Nits

This is a bis draft of the HIP (Host Identity Protocol) Architecture and
because of that I focused on what’s changed (i.e., I reviewed the diffs from
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=rfc4423&url2=draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis-18). 
It’s still HIP but with a slightly expanded scope; it’s still Informational.

1. s4: The one place where I’ll step out from not looking at the old is a
similar-ish recommendation that was in the RF4423:

   In this document, the non-cryptographic forms of HI and HIP are
   presented to complete the theory of HI, but they should not be
   implemented as they could produce worse denial-of-service attacks
   than the Internet has without Host Identity.

Should the should not be a SHOULD NOT?

2. (none security) s4.4: Is the paragraph about IPv4 vs IPv6 vs LSI really
necessary?  I.e., is this yet another thing that folks are going to use to not
transition to IPv6?

3. s11.2: Isn’t an additional drawback the need to have a HIP-aware firewall?