[secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-ecrit-similar-location-17

Scott Kelly via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Sat, 12 February 2022 18:45 UTC

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Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2022 10:45:29 -0800
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Subject: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-ecrit-similar-location-17
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Reviewer: Scott Kelly
Review result: Ready

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.
 Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other
last call comments.

The summary of the review is ready.

>From the abstract, this document introduces a new way to provide returned
location information in LoST responses that is either of a completed or similar
form to the original input civic location, based on whether valid or invalid
civic address elements are returned within the  <findServiceResponse> message.

The security considerations section considers that this mechanism may disclose
information, and that implementers should consider the implications of this in
the context of their service.  If I were writing this section, I might start by
saying (because this doc extends RFC 5222) that all of the security
considerations of 5222 apply, but this is implicit, and I don't feel strongly
about this.

>From a security considerations perspective, I think this document is ready.