Re: [TLS] Signed messages should be prefixed with a NUL-terminated context string.

[Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <[e-mail]>]

----- Original Message -----
> This seems like a good idea. Thanks for raising it.

An additional issue of switching to the new CertificateVerify
format for client and server, is that privilege separation for
authentication is not possible any more.

On a previous mail I was asking for that feature to be extended for the 
server as well:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg13398.html

Was the removal of that protocol feature intentional?

If not I'd suggest the following format for the signatures:
      struct {
           digitally-signed struct {
               opaque client_random[32];
               opaque server_random[32];
               opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length];
           }
      } CertificateVerify;

regards,
Nikos