Re: [TLS] Encrypt-then-HMAC is the only credible choice. Here's why:
Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> Tue, 19 November 2013 09:36 UTC
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Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2013 10:36:40 +0100
Message-ID: <CADMpkcKP+wzaqbb8guUH-4qo6rLz_prR8mtLVsYpObgGmOjDEw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org>
To: Marsh Ray <maray@microsoft.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Encrypt-then-HMAC is the only credible choice. Here's why:
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Marsh, as I said, you *are* right [*], it's just that there's a lot more to it than Bellare/Namprempre (which doesn't consider side-channel attacks, for example). [*] Another gross over-simplification :-)
- [TLS] Encrypt-then-HMAC is the only credible choi… Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Encrypt-then-HMAC is the only credible … Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [TLS] Encrypt-then-HMAC is the only credible … Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] Encrypt-then-HMAC is the only credible … Tom Ritter
- Re: [TLS] Encrypt-then-HMAC is the only credible … Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Encrypt-then-HMAC is the only credible … Robert Ransom
- Re: [TLS] Encrypt-then-HMAC is the only credible … Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Encrypt-then-HMAC is the only credible … Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Encrypt-then-HMAC is the only credible … Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Encrypt-then-HMAC is the only credible … Bodo Moeller