Re: [TLS] Closing on PSS. PR#1114
Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com> Mon, 11 December 2017 07:59 UTC
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From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2017 08:59:44 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Closing on PSS. PR#1114
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On Tue, 2017-12-05 at 12:00 +0100, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote: > On Mon, 2017-12-04 at 17:24 -0800, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > Hi folks, > > > > I've put together a PR that attemps to address the PSS issue. > > > > See: > > https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1114 As I guess, we cannot mandate RSA-PSS private keys and certificates for TLS1.3, I've followed up with a subsection on security considerations for re-using the RSA and RSA-PSS private keys. That includes recommendations to reduce the impact from cross-protocol attacks affecting these keys. https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1123 regards, Nikos
- [TLS] Closing on PSS. PR#1114 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Closing on PSS. PR#1114 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] Closing on PSS. PR#1114 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Closing on PSS. PR#1114 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Closing on PSS. PR#1114 Ilari Liusvaara