Re: [TLS] New version of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk after the WGLC

(sorry for the trouble in my last mail subject)

Dear Pasi,

 > The contents of the draft have changed quite a bit since version -02
 > (which was posted just before the Dublin meeting), and I have some
 > comments about the changes:

In fact, we discussed adding SHA256 and SHA348 to the document to avoid 
publishing several seperated documents; and if I recall well, your 
recommendation was to do that in one single document. If the group 
doesn't agree with this change, I will post the old version.

 > It's a bit surprising that e.g. TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
 > when negotiated in TLS 1.2, would use the TLS PRF with SHA-1 as the
 > hash function. Note that e.g. TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (from
 > RFC 4279) would in this situation use the TLS PRF with SHA-256.

In this case, I would know where I can read that cipher suites described 
in RFC 4492, when negotiated in TLS 1.2, will use the TLS PRF with 
SHA-256. Do you refer to Section 5 of TLS 1.2?

The same for TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.

 >
 > My suggestion would be to say that all these cipher suites can be
 > negotiated with any TLS version; when used with TLS <1.2, they use
 > the PRF from that version; when used with TLS >=1.2, they use the
 > TLS PRF with SHA-256 or SHA-384. (In other words: they'd work the
 > same way as the cipher suites in RFC 4492/4279/4785.)
 >
 > This change would probably allow us to remove the SHA-1 suites
 > completely.

With regard to version 2 of the document, only SHA-1 suites are 
described. So why we need to do this step?

 > Also, while I can understand combining AES-128 with
 > SHA-256, and AES-256 with SHA-384, I'm not sure why we need to
 > combine NULL encryption with three different MACs...
 >

In the case we are going to remove the SHA-1 suites with NULL 
encryption, only 2 combinations will be available  (if we keep the logic 
of moving away from SHA-1 and towards stronger hash algorithms, as RFC 
5288 and 5289 do).

Best regards,
Badra

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