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Re: [TLS] Broken browser behaviour with SCADA TLS

Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Wed, 04 July 2018 12:24 UTC

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Date: Wed, 04 Jul 2018 14:24:07 +0200
From: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Broken browser behaviour with SCADA TLS
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On Wed, Jul 04, 2018 at 12:01:18PM +0200, Hubert Kario wrote:
> what "browser extensions"? you can't really do a modern TLS 1.2 without 
> extensions, let alone TLS 1.3 (which is now enabled by default in NSS). I'm 
> quite sure NSS didn't drop any consequential ones...

The extensions are not related to TLS, but are extentions /
add-ons of the browser itself. Firefox dropped support for the
old way of doing extensions in version 57. They also added the
WebExtensions API that is also implemented in other browsers.
This required major rewrites of the extensions, and some were
never changed to work with the new API.


Kurt

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